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Abstract 
Wireless networking is among the fastest growing trends in technology. For military 
objectives wireless networks are effective and flexible ways of communicating, and important 
elements in operating quick, accurate and independent. Over the last year’s commercial 
technology, based on the wireless IEEE 802.11 standard has grown to be low-cost products 
offering cheap and easy ways to establish rapid communication services. For all that, lacking 
elements of security, increased availability, weak mechanisms and capabilities in order to 
protect and safeguard private wireless networking, concerns costumers which require high 
assurance communication facilities. To comply with physical security, high-end wireless 
security requirements and protection mechanisms are required to fully ensure the wireless 
environment and control the enterprise. Wireless networks has not been considered secure 
enough to be implemented as part of high assurance communication systems which have 
access to classified information networks. This thesis considers security aspects of wireless 
networking related to access control and availability, which means that a wide range of 
security issues will be discussed. Based on availability, the thesis will focus on requirements 
and mechanisms related to authentication, confidentiality, integrity and authenticity.  
 
The thesis has indicated through two problem scenarios that high-end requirements signifies 
complexity and that security mechanisms must be implemented through adoption and 
adjustment of the available security protocols IEEE 802.1X and IEEE 802.11i. Still, the thesis 
has shown that security protocols such as IEEE 802.1X and 802.11i does not solve all security 
problems. Additional wireless protection systems are required to supervise and control state 
security in order to protect the wireless network environment. In addition, network-layer 
security is required to oblige end-to-end security control. The conclusion brings security in 
wireless network into comprehensive challenges that require fully control to analyze data and 
operations to consolidate the wireless environment. 
 
Considering wireless protection systems which operate as integrated parts of high assurance 
wireless system, the thesis has investigated mechanisms and ways to actively protect the 
wireless network environment. The thesis has shown that wireless monitor and honeypot 
networks introduce potential solutions to meet availability aspects in turns of automatic 
detection, protection and prevention.   
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Thesis definition 
The Norwegian Defence owns and manages its own information and communication network 
based on known IP technology. The infrastructure today is based on wired communication 
using both copper and fiber optic cables. As an extension of this environment, FLO/IKT 
would like to add wireless solutions. However, it is very important that such wireless 
networks do not leak any information or data that can be used to compromise the information 
system. To prevent this FLO/IKT would like to insert mechanisms and implement solutions for 
prevention and protection. This thesis will consider security aspects of wireless IEEE 802.11 
environments, and discuss secure architectures based on available components and 
technology. Earlier studies of wireless networks have concluded that wireless technology is 
not mature enough and should be precluded from use in terms of critical infrastructure, or in 
environments where availability is a primary requirement. Due to the fact that research has 
improved security in wireless systems, the main research questions in this thesis will be;  
 
1. Is it possible with today’s knowledge and technology to design and implement a 
wireless system platform based on IEEE 802.11 technologies, which can be 
recommended for use in a military environment with access to classified information?   
 
2. Due do the facts that wireless networks being an open medium available for an 
outsider and based on the surrounding threats, is it possible with today’s technology 
to insert mechanisms and components that are capable of controlling the wireless 
network activity? 
 
The thesis will investigate security aspects connected to access control technology, 
confidentiality and availability and suggest ways to protect the wireless environment against 
malicious activity and attacks. The thesis work will be focused on different described security 
scenarios which will be related to operational activity.  If conclusions or part of the 
conclusions means any change or add in the today’s WLAN/LAN architecture, the changes 
must be adapted regarding the over all security requirements. All changes in security 
architecture and mechanisms related to information and communication services must be 
evaluated and approved by the Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM). 
  Author: Tor Kristian Borgi and Magne Arild Haglund
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1.1 Problem introduction and background 
Security in wireless networks is a well defined problem area. Because of the availability and 
the lack of control over which subjects receiving signals from the network, a challenge in 
developing secure solutions based on wireless technology will arise. The problem area has a 
range of security challenges associated and many of them differ in technology classifications. 
Basically there are two parts of the WLAN security conundrum. One concerns wireless 
availability, which involves access control and confidentiality requirements using 
authentication, encryption and integrity. The second concerns monitoring and attacks 
affecting the infrastructure, which requires detection and protection mechanisms to prevent 
the systems from being compromised. Attackers using wireless clients and rogue access 
points to gain access to wireless systems are a threat as well as internal factors that will 
degrade the wireless network performance. FLO/IKT is responsible for delivering information 
and communication services for the Norwegian Defence. As a consequence of this, security 
features are important and needs to be thoroughly considered. FLO/IKT would like to offer 
flexible and effective communication services to meet the demanding and requirements from 
operational activities. Providing new services involves security considerations and it is 
important that such solutions do not signify weaknesses which are capable of disrupting or 
compromising the system.  
 
The use of wireless networks based on the IEEE 802.11 standard [8] has increased 
dramatically over the last years. Producers and the commercial market offer laptops, mobiles 
and other computer widgets with automatic built-in wireless IEEE 802.11 technology. This 
has influenced users and communities which have discovered the big advantages of going 
wireless. Wireless networks will probably continue to grow and many people will rely on its 
services.  Interacting wirelessly is undoubtedly effective, flexible and inexpensive ways of 
communicating. For military objectives efficient communication is an important element in 
operating quick and accurate. In difference, wireless networks being an open medium with no 
precise bounds make it difficult to apply physical security. Compared to wired networks, 
privacy can not be compromised unless someone uses special equipment to intercept data. To 
implement wireless solutions in terms of providing access to classified networks, security 
elements need to be closely evaluated. Wireless access involves employing approved methods 
for access control, confidentiality and integrity which are well documented and authorized for 
use in a military context.  
 Agder University College Faculty of Engineering and Science 
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1.2 Concepts and definitions 
Concepts Definitions [20,11] 
 
Classified networks 
The Norwegian classifications grouping 
consist of four levels of sensitivity; 
BEGRENSET, KONFIDENSIELT, 
HEMMELIG and STRENGT-HEMMELIG. 
BEGRENSET The lowest of four Norwegian classification 
levels.  
Controlled area An area where the user organisation applies 
legal measures to control access 
Authentication Establishing the genuineness or correctness 
of an entity or of some information 
Authorisation The permission to access and perform 
operations on some information. 
Authenticity The correctness of an entity or some 
information 
 
Association 
A relationship between objects which allows 
objects to perform an action on its behalf. 
[11] 
 
Encryption and cryptographic mechanisms 
A function, algorithm or protocol designed to 
provide or support provision of 
confidentiality, integrity or authenticity 
 
Integrity 
The property that some information has not 
been subjected to unauthorized change 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
 
Intrusion detection is the process of 
monitoring data traffic in a computer system 
or network and analysis the data for 
intrusion attempting to compromise 
confidentiality, integrity or availability [72].  
 
Smartcard  
A smartcard is defined as any pocket sized 
card with embedded electronic integrated 
circuits containing memory storage 
components, security logics and perhaps a 
 Agder University College Faculty of Engineering and Science 
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microprocessor component.   
Institute for Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers (IEEE) 
 
 
 
 
The IEEE is non-profit professional 
organization founded by engineers in 1884 
for the purpose of consolidating ideas 
dealing with electro technology. The IEEE 
plays a significant role in publishing 
technical networks and network standard 
developments. For example IEEE 802.3 
(Ethernet), IEEE 802.5 (token ring) ) and  
the IEEE 802.11 (WLAN) standard. [48] 
National institute of standards and 
technology  (NIST) 
NIST is a none-regular agency of the United 
States Department of commerce’s 
Technology administration. The mission is to 
advance measurements science, standards 
and technology to improve quality and 
enhance security.   
Federal information processing standard 
(FIPS)  
FIPS are publicly announced standards 
developed by United states federal 
government for use by all none-military 
governments’ agencies and government 
contractors.   
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)  
Traditional PKI is based on certificates 
containing asymmetric crypto using private 
and public encryption keys.    
Hardware Security Module (HSM) 
HSM is usually referred to as a external 
plug-in-card or devices which can be used to 
securely generate and protect crypto 
graphical  secrets for example certificates 
and private keys used for authentication. 
Table 1: Master thesis concepts and definitions 
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1.3 Security requirements 
 
To address military network security requirements [20], solutions must be adapted according 
to the level of confidentiality and sensitivity. The “BEGRENSET” level of confidentiality, 
which is relevant for this master thesis, is defined as the following:  
 
BEGRENSET shall be used if it could to any extent entail adverse consequences for 
the security of Norway or its allies, its relationship with foreign powers or other vital 
national security interests if the information were to become known to unauthorized 
persons. [20] 
 
Basic security requirements are expressed and defined for level BEGRENSET and below 
(unclassified). The definition of basic security is based and founded on the level of 
confidentiality and is described as follows:   
 
Basic security: When a breach of the service results in loss of integrity or 
authentication of systems or information, causing damage equivalent to compromise 
of unclassified information or information classified BEGRENSET. [20]  
 
As described in [20], the basic security level may apply to situations where loss of integrity or 
authentication of systems or information causes only disturbance on mission or system 
effectiveness. This thesis deals with communication systems connected to classified networks 
approved for BEGRENSET and signifies that system requirements are related to elements of 
“Basic security”.  The level of “Basic security” contains requirements according to the 
employment of approved cryptographic mechanisms, integrity and authenticity, which will 
not be evaluated in this document. Such approvals and accreditation must be conducted by the 
Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM). Suggestions in this master thesis will be 
based on official documents, research and general security methodology. Another concern 
related to wireless network is the adoption of physical security, which involves physical 
control to network resources, such as infrastructures, system-components and devices. 
Physical security can not be applied to radio waves and therefore security needs to be ensured 
using approved cryptographic techniques. This thesis will consider architectures, methods and 
protocols which can be used to improve and increase the overall security and trust in wireless 
environments base on 802.11 technologies.         
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1.4 Problem area 
Working with security in wireless local area networks is a comprehensive field. In order to 
evaluate and analyze security aspects connected to classified network, all paramount security 
conundrums needs to be considered. On top of the hierarchy there are basically four central 
research objectives and requirements relevant for this master thesis [10, 11]:  
 
 Access control – Includes restrictions to individuals or devices to access 
network resources. This involves system authentication, message authenticity 
and authorization mechanisms.  
 Confidentiality – Ensuring that information can only be read by those 
authorized to have access. This involves using cryptographic mechanisms to 
protect information being transmitted.     
 Integrity – Detection and protection of unauthorized changes to data during 
communication. This involves using cryptographic hash mechanisms to detect 
unauthorized modifications.   
 Availability – Ensuring that authorized individuals and devices can access 
resources when needed, as well as prevent access from unauthorized devices.   
 
To build security in wireless networks it is required to design a secure framework that consists 
of approved mechanisms for access control, confidentiality and integrity. These are typical 
security classifications which are important in any communication network, but in a wireless 
context such mechanisms are essential. Availability concerns two important security related 
aspects. The first aspect is connected to availability for those authorized to use the network 
and assurance that services are accessible. The other aspect is related to the fact that radio 
equipment, radio waves and radio signals are available to others in the area, including 
neighbours and possible intruders. This requires severe quality to cryptographic technology 
protecting the wireless information flow. In other words, security in wireless networks needs 
to be addressed to all four research objectives; access control, confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. 
 
Another important objective is that wireless security solutions must be applied according to 
the specific employment and the surrounding threats. There is no fully answer to how security 
should be constructed and deployed in a wireless environment, but there exist several 
different protocols, methods and mechanisms that may be implemented in order to form an 
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accommodation for a best practice security solution. One of the biggest challenges is to shape 
a consistent and effective solution which transparently takes care of security issues in a 
controllable context and protects the environment against particular threats and 
vulnerabilities.      
1.4.1 Security problem scenarios 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate security related mechanisms and systems which can be 
used to improve security in wireless networks. Wireless networks based on IEEE 802.11 
technologies may range many types of applications, and the employment may have different 
purposes. The thesis will discuss and suggest security related improvements related to two 
problem scenarios. These scenarios are both connected to a deployment of networks based on 
the wireless standard; IEEE 802.11. In general, these types of network are easy to use, most of 
them inexpensive, and highly flexible for interconnection and communication. If we are able 
to add high level of security which can ensure reliable services, wireless network systems may 
become attractive solutions for building secure, flexible and transparent network 
communication facilities. Below I will introduce both security problems, which I will handle 
and evaluate in my master thesis. Both security cases are connected to operational contexts 
and are based on using commercial products in terms of providing access to classified 
systems. Each scenario will be described generally, which means that the existing overall 
system solution will not be explained in details regarding security restrictions. I will also refer 
to chapter 6 for further information and details.        
1.4.1.1 Case one 
Case number one is related to wireless links between two access points (nodes), “one-to-one”, 
whereas one of the nodes is connected to a mobile unit environment communicating with its 
home network environment. In this case confidentiality and integrity are insured using virtual 
private network (VPN) technology based on IP security encapsulating security payload (IPsec 
ESP) as an end-to-end security solution. The mobile unit environment is then able to 
communicate with its home environment systems, classified and approved for 
“BEGRENSET”. The security issues in this case are connected to access control and 
availability aspects to the wireless IEEE 802.11 network and its devices. The wireless 
network components need to be secured and protected against intruders and malicious 
activity. Both access points are physically secured, but are located in public areas. This means 
that since we are using commercial products operating within a commercial frequency area, 
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the radio signals are public available. This requires severe security mechanisms which are 
able to confine access to the wireless system as well as protecting the access points (AP’s). 
This problem scenario involves threats ranging from high professional attackers to regular 
people who just happen to be in the area. The wireless systems should be configured in a way 
that network facilities are logical concealed. If this is possible it will prevent most devices 
from requesting services from the AP. Another important issue is connected to control within 
the radio channel range, which indicates the ability to detect wireless unauthorized devices 
experimenting to associate with the high assurance wireless network.  Figure 1 shows an 
overview of this problem scenario. 
 
 
Figure 1: Case one, problem scenario descriptions. 
Case number one describes a scenario where it is required to add mechanisms and systems 
that are capable of controlling access to the wireless environment, including the ability of 
detect local intruders fumbling with the wireless network. It is also important to look at 
protection mechanisms which are able to avoid unauthorized devices from trying to attack or 
associate with the wireless system.    
1.4.1.2 Case two 
Problem scenario number two has a different security operational setting and involves 
wireless clients communicating with a wireless access point within controlled area. This 
scenario differs from the previous case because confidentiality, authenticity and integrity must 
be added on to the wireless client device. In other words, this case involves security aspects 
connected to a deployment of a wireless system in a “one-to-many” operational setting. Based 
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on this, case two consists of a whole different range of security challenges to be considered. 
Basically, the VPN-IPsec ESP solution only provides secure interconnection between the 
mobile environment and the home environment. In addition we need to add security 
mechanisms to protect wireless communication, the clients, and the access point. The 
communication needs to be secured using commercial security protocols and techniques. This 
signifies that such a configuration must be closely evaluated. The thesis goal in this case is to 
suggest ways to secure a wireless environment based on high-end security requirements, 
forming the best practice security architecture. This includes proposing ways to secure the 
communication between clients (STA’s) and the AP as well as the ability to control the 
wireless environment and wireless infrastructure. Figure 2 shows an overview of this problem 
scenario context.   
 
Figure 2: Case two, problem scenario description.  
To make a secure solution we need to address threats, vulnerabilities and add high-end 
requirements considering infrastructure based wireless networks. The main focus will be 
access control and availability aspects, which involves implementing authentication and 
confidentiality mechanisms as well as systems for wireless control with detection and 
protection capabilities.   
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1.4.2 Particular sub problems 
1. How to design a secure solution for wireless access control? 
a. A fundamental issue designing secure wireless solutions is to make sure that 
only authorized users may access the wireless network. This sub problem 
involves studying centralized access control systems and authentication 
methods based on the IEEE 802.1X protocol used in wireless networks. The 
preferred access control solution should be described through claims based on 
a well known security foundation. This sub problem involves choosing set of 
mechanisms, protocols to discuss appropriate architectural requirements.  
 
2. How to provide confidentiality, integrity and authenticity? 
a. The only approved solution for transmitting military classified data over 
unsecured networks is using military encryption-devices, developed and 
approved by the National Security Authority. The solution is based on 
network-layer security mechanisms and is not adapted for use in wireless 
networks. To ensure confidentiality, integrity and authenticity in wireless 
networks it is required to investigate link-layer (OSI-layer-2) security aspects 
to consider commercial technology that offers over-the-air cryptographic 
mechanisms and protection functionality. It is required to discuss the wireless 
security standard IEEE 802.11i, addressing WPA2 security features, to 
investigate and discuss potential solutions. 
            
3. How to secure the wireless infrastructure against local threats and availability aspects?  
a. Because of availability, wireless technology used in high assurance networks, 
represents a wide range of threats and vulnerabilities to be considered. To 
establish secure wireless solutions it is required to discuss the circumstances of 
availability related to wireless IEEE 802.11 networking involving high degree 
of availability to equipment, radio signals and security technology. Based on 
the lacking possibilities to provide physical security in wireless network, it is 
required to investigate security mechanisms capable to control the wireless 
environment. This sub problem involves studying mechanisms for control, 
detection and protection of wireless high assurance environments to prevent 
the wireless system from being compromised.  
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1.5 Methods and thesis work 
This thesis work will be based on descriptive and explanatory research, founded on theoretical 
approaches to implement high assurance wireless networks. The thesis has defined two 
problem scenarios which will be discussed and solved through a study based on prior 
research, approved documents and general security methodology. The thesis work will focus 
on architectural challenges combined with problem issues including principals, methods, 
protocols, mechanisms and features which involve defining high-end security requirements to 
enable high assurance wireless network communication.  
1.6 Delimitations and presumptions 
Security in wireless networks is a comprehensive topic and it is an extensive process to 
consider all security aspects of wireless networking. The thesis will handle security aspects 
connected to access control and availability, which involves authentication, confidentiality, 
integrity and authenticity. Due to the time limit, the thesis will not be able to deliver a finished 
product on how to secure a wireless network infrastructure. Based on two problem scenarios, 
the goal of this thesis will be to study and discuss important security aspects and challenges 
and propose security requirements recommended for high assurance wireless network. The 
scope will be confined by the network layer (OSI-layer-3) of the Open System 
Interconnection Basic Reference model (OSI-model), but the main focus will be the physical-
layer (OSI-layer-1) and the link-layer (OSI-layer-2). The specification of this master thesis 
document will be based on the IEEE 802.11 standard and the thesis will basically focus on 
IEEE 802.11X and the IEEE 802.11i settlement, known as WPA 2.0, on how to establish 
secure wireless communication channels. Older security protocols already known as insecure, 
such as WEP, will not be considered in this thesis. In addition the thesis will study wireless 
monitoring and intrusion detection and protection systems for wireless networks. Wireless 
protection mechanisms are highly challenging fields, and official research paper and 
documents are lacking on this area. Thus, the thesis work will be based on ideas, some prior 
approved documents and proposals according to implement mechanisms for automatic 
protection of high assurance wireless environments. 
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1.7 Requirements 
Basic knowledge of radio technology anatomy and wireless IEEE 802.11 networks is 
required. Basic understanding of the OSI-model is an advantage, and knowledge to 
information security is presumed.  
 
1.8 Motivation and thesis outcome 
Wireless communication offers organisations and users many benefits compared to wired 
infrastructures and wireless networking is among the fastest growing trends in technology. In 
difference, security contribution is a rather slow process, which sometimes tends to be 
neglected by product developers and vendors offering commercial communication products. 
Higher data-rates, flexibility, transparency, low cost, and other features make it easier for the 
publicity to use and employ wireless networks. Security is very often not a concern before 
someone, or something exploits and utilizes weak points in communication in order to collect 
information, steal facts or particulars based on, for example financial motives. Security must 
be a closely integrated process of product development, and upcoming products should be 
strictly evaluated before they can be implemented into high assurance networks. Even though, 
security in wireless IEEE 802.11 networks is a popular research area and over the last years a 
lot of security related work has been composed. The challenge is that no standard approved 
model has been created according to recommend wireless solutions for use in high assurance 
environments with access to, for example classified information networks. Previous papers 
and research have concluded fatal weaknesses to wireless networks, which signify that such 
networks should not be connected to systems requiring high level of security. Vendors and 
researchers have contributed in developing security protocols, mechanisms, functionality and 
systems to increase security for wireless network establishments. This development is 
interesting approaches when it comes to designing secure wireless environments and 
constructing wireless solutions for military purposes. The outcome of this thesis will be 
important work and contribution according to visualize requirements and challenges in terms 
of using wireless communication systems for enclosed computer networks and high assurance 
prospectives.   
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1.9 Project outline 
This master thesis provides the following project outline:  
 
 Chapter 2: Introduces the basics of wireless LAN technology based on the IEEE 
802.11 standard and presents wireless LAN threat aspects, security protocols and 
protection technology.  
 
 Chapter 3: Discusses access control and security requirements based on IEEE 802.1X 
standard.  
 
 Chapter 4: Discusses confidentiality, integrity and authenticity mechanisms based on 
the IEEE 802.11i standard framework. 
 
 Chapter 5: Discusses availability aspects and investigates ways to monitor, control, 
supervise and protect the wireless LAN environment.  
 
 Chapter 6: Proposes requirements and architectural ways to implement high assurance 
security networks in context of two relevant WLAN security scenarios (case one and 
case two). 
 
 Chapter 7: Conclusion and further work 
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2 Preliminaries and literature studies 
This chapter presents basic introduction to the IEEE 802.11 standard network protocol, 
describing general operations and functionality related to wireless infrastructure networking. 
Additional the chapter introduces known threats and vulnerabilities concerning IEEE 802.11 
networks, and provides a brief overview of WLAN security aspects including specification, 
security standards, and security functionalities. Security issues related to access control, 
confidentiality and availability will be introduced together with protocol specifications, 
mechanisms and security improvements composed over the last years. The introduction will 
basically restrict to OSI-layer one and OSI-layer two securities, but at the end of this chapter 
OSI-layer three security mechanism adapted for wireless networks will be mentioned.  
2.1 The wireless architectural model 
The IEEE 802.11 standard defines a topological infrastructure which offers wireless 
communication services approximately comparable to the IEEE 802.3 Ethernet standard. 
Ethernet is based on permanent cable infrastructure which limits the ability to provide mobile 
and seamless connectivity services. To create a wireless network, basic wireless network 
components interact and establish wireless services through known concepts of radio 
communication.  Consequently these wireless systems build their own architectural model 
providing mobile and flexible local area network services. The infrastructure model consists 
of wireless clients and access points providing connectivity within the radio coverage area. 
Below some basic definitions from [15, 9] introducing the concept of wireless infrastructure 
networking are presented.  
 
 Infrastructure Mode – A wireless configuration where an access point transfers data 
from different STAs to a wired distribution system. 
 Access Point (AP) – An AP is wireless logical unit which connects different STAs 
with a wired network infrastructure (Distribution system). 
 Stations (STA) – A wireless endpoint device such as laptop, mobile phone, PDA. 
 Basic service set (BSS) – BSS is the basic building block of a WLAN. The BSS 
consists of on AP surrounded with one or more STAs configured in infrastructure 
mode. 
 Distribution system (DS) – DS is an infrastructure, typical wired LANs, that 
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interconnects different BSSs 
 Extended service set (ESS) – ESS is a WLAN consisting of more than one BSS 
connected to distribution system (DS).  
 
A representative IEEE 802.11 network infrastructure consists of one or more access points 
(AP) offering wireless communication within the radio coverage area. To connect to an AP 
you will need a wireless network card (WNC) designed for the IEEE 802.11 communication 
standard. The AP is usually connected to a distribution system (DS) which offers access to 
local information systems, application-services and links to other networks. An overview of a 
typical wireless LAN system is shown in figure 3.  
     
 
Figure 3: Wireless IEEE 802.11 topology in infrastructure mode 
2.2 Physical characteristics 
In June 1997 [48], the IEEE organization finalized the initial standard of wireless IEEE 
802.11 networks. The IEEE 802.11 topology, as shown in figure 3, consists of interacting 
components providing wireless LAN’s (WLAN) services that enable mobile and transparent 
communication facilities for higher protocol layers [39]. The standard specifies two different 
radio frequency ranges, the 802.11a standard using the 5 GHz frequency band and 802.11b 
standard using the 2.4 GHz ISM band. These specifications are based on physical 
characteristics which contain functionality and properties to provide radio network 
communication services. In table 2 and an overview of physical characteristics of WLAN 
systems are shown.   
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Characteristics of WLAN Description 
 
Physical layer 
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS), 
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum 
(FHSS), Orthogonal Frequency Division 
Multiplexing (OFDM), IR 
 
Random Access Control 
Carrier Sence Multiple Access with Collision 
Aviodance (CSMA/CA) 
  
 
 
 
Modulation schemes 
OFDM Binary phase shift keying (BPSK) –  
1 to 2Mbps. 
OFDM Quadrature phase shift keying 
(QPSK) – 5,5 to11Mbps.  
OFDM 64- Quadrature phase shift keying 
(64-QPSK) – up to 54 Mbps. 
OFDM-MIMO 256 Quadrture phase shift 
keying (256-QPSK) – up to 300Mbps. 
Standard WLAN models 802.11a, 802.11h, 802.11b, 802.11g, 802.11n 
 
Coding techniques 
11bit- barker code sequence 
8 bit - Complementary Code Keying (CCK) 
 
Frequency band 
802.11 b, g and n: 
2.400 – 2.4835 Ghz (ISM band) and  
802.11 a, h and n: 
5,150 - 5350 Ghz  and  
5,725 – 5,825 Ghz  
Channels 802.11b and g  - 11 channels (3 none 
overlapping channels)  
802.11a and h – 8 channels (none 
overlapping)  
 
Data rates 
1 Mbps, 2Mbps 11Mbps (11b), 54 Mb (11a 
og 11g), 300Mbps (11n) 
  
 
Defined protocol layers 
Physical layer (PHY), Medium Access 
Control (MAC) and Logical Link Control 
(LLC)  
Operation range 50-100 meters 
Security standards 802.1X , 802.11i, 802.11w 
Table 2: Characteristics of WLANs  
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2.3 IEEE 802.11 protocol 
The following section provides a small introduction to the wireless communication based on 
the IEEE 802 11 standard. To be able to discuss security within wireless networks we need to 
address the main functionality and characteristics of the basic protocol. The IEEE 802.11 
protocol describes the two lowest layers of the OSI-model [39, 48]. As shown in figure 4 
these two layers provide requisite functionality to enable wireless communication facilities. 
The physical layer defines electrical and mechanical characteristics providing encoding 
schemes and modulation mechanisms enabling transmissions of bits through a wireless 
communication channel. The data link layer provides medium access control (MAC) and 
logical link control (LLC) enabling multiple appliances to share a transmission medium via 
carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) techniques [48]. Basically, these two layers provide the 
physical framework for sending data packets between two network entities, for example 
between wireless stations (STAs) and access points (APs). Usually entity communication is 
protected by cables which offer enclosed physical connections between two network 
components. The unique about IEEE 802.11 networks is that OSI-layer 1 and OSI-layer 2 
information are available for anyone within radio range. This availability aspect is of concern 
regarding security considerations, and for high assurance networks which implements 
wireless communication services.   
 
Figure 4: Corresponding of the IEEE 802.11 layers to the layers of the OSI Model [43] 
 
 Agder University College Faculty of Engineering and Science 
  18 
The IEEE 802.11 networks address the OSI data-link layer (MAC/LCC) and the physical 
layer (OSI-PHY). As you can se from figure 5, the physical layer defines the different 
wireless standards related to 802.11 networks. The Data-link MAC layer provides 
interoperability between the physical layer and upper layers using a medium control 
mechanism called CSMA/CA. Since all users share the same media and radio frequencies, 
CSMA/CA sense the medium before sending data and uses a random back off timer if the 
medium is busy. In addition, the MAC layer defines functionality for medium reservation 
using ready-to-send/clear-to-send (RTS/CTS) polling coordination. These mechanisms 
together avoid clients and data-packets from interference and collisions. 
      
 
Figure 5: Lower OSI layers corresponding the IEEE 802.11 structure. 
 
 
The Logical Link control (LLC) [48] is the highest layer of the data link protocol and 
provides functionality to exchange data between end users across the wireless LAN. The LLC 
tasks are connected to addressing and data link control mechanisms indicating that the LLC 
layer is responsible for transmitting error-free layer 2 packets from one destination to another. 
To provide this functionality the LLC appends a control header and creates an LLC protocol 
data unit (PDU), which adds control information at the beginning and at the end of the MAC 
frame packet. This control information is needed for quality assurance and operation of the 
MAC protocol. 
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The data link layer (LLC/MAC) communicates with each other using simple service 
primitives [48]. These primitives define the protocol functionality in general. 
  
 Request – request services from other layers 
 Confirm – conveys the result of previous services  
 Indication – indicate for other layers that a significant event has occurred 
 Response – completes a procedure indicated by a indication primitive 
 
These data link primitives can handle connection oriented services and 
acknowledged/unacknowledged connectionless services which depends on the LLC 
implementation. In the next section we will take a look at the data-link layer communication 
format, the MAC frame structure.    
2.3.1 IEEE 802.11 frame structure 
The IEEE 802.11 standard specifies the MAC frame format [5, 48], consisting of a MAC 
header, a Frame Body and Frame Check Sequence (FCS). This format is shown in figure 6.       
 
Figure 6: The overall MAC frame format [9]. 
The frame body contains MAC frame payloads, which depending on the frame type includes 
application data from higher layers of the OSI-model. The FCS field contains a 32-bit cyclic 
redundancy check (CRC) which calculates the entire MAC frame to verify transmission 
errors. The MAC header is quite interesting in wireless contexts, because this header will be 
visible for anyone monitoring the wireless network. The MAC header consist of 4 address 
fields, 1 frame control field, 1 sequence control field and a ID/duration field. The address 
 Agder University College Faculty of Engineering and Science 
  20 
field 2, 3 and 4, the sequence control field and the frame body are not found in every frame 
[5], indicating that these fields are optional and based on the message intention. The frame 
control field, showed in figure 6, carries information necessary for the STA’s and the AP to 
read, understand and handle the MAC frame. This frame information contains basic frame 
control data including frame type and subtype, if the frame originates from a DS or from the 
wireless network and if the frame is encrypted. The duration/ID field [5] includes a duration 
value and identifies the duration of the next frame sent from a STA or AP. Other STAs on the 
network monitor this information, to hold off transmissions and prevent collisions. The 
address field contains different types of addresses depending on the frame being sent. There 
are basically five types of addresses being transmitted, source address, destination address, 
transmitting station address, receiving station address and the basic service set identification 
(BSSID). These addresses are based on 48-bit IEEE 802 Link Layer Address [5], also referred 
to as MAC-address. The BSSID defines the MAC-address of the AP and for infrastructure 
networks this address is used to connect STAs to the corresponding AP. The frame body has a 
variable length and the payload carries information according to the specific frame. This field 
may contain a PDU (LLC), as described in section 2.3, providing application data. The 
sequence control field is used to control the number of PDU’s (LLC) being transmitted, by 
incrementing a sequence number field for each successive transmission.             
 
2.3.2 IEEE 802.11 frame types 
Regarding different types of MAC-frame data, the frame structure shown in figure 6 is passed 
to the physical layer for transmission. The physical layer appends a new header at the front of 
every transmission frame. The MAC-frame carries information that pertains to the specific 
frame and the functionality of the data packet. Based on this the IEEE 802.11 specification 
divides MAC-frames into three categories being transmitted between STAs and AP in an 
IEEE 802.11 network [9, 48]: 
 
 Data frames.  The data frame carries the payload from upper layers of the OSI-
model. This payload is encapsulated and forwarded in PDU packets determined by 
the LLC layer. The data frames allow upper layer application to deliver data packets 
between STA’s and AP.  
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 Management frames. Management frames are responsible for carrying management 
information. The purpose of management frames is to establish initial communication 
between STAs and AP. Management frames provides the ability to handle MAC layer 
services such as authentication, association, beacons and probe-request and other 
required messages handlings between STAs and AP. 
   
 Control frames. After an authentication and association process, the control frames 
are used to control the exchange and the flow of data frames. Examples of control 
frames are request to send (RTS), clear to send (CTS), acknowledgement (ACK), 
power save Poll (PS Poll) etc.  
 
These three types of MAC-frames are all required to provide wireless communication 
facilities. Regarding security in wireless networks, security protocols such as IEEE 802.11i 
has been introduced to protect the Data-frames. This protocol will be closer described in 
section 2.5. Unfortunately no available protocol standard has been focusing on protecting the 
Management-frames and the Control-frames, but a new upcoming security standard, 802.11w 
is working on this security issue.     
 
2.3.3 The 802.11 state machine and the association process 
The IEEE 802.11 standard defines different types of MAC-frames providing services for the 
LLC to exchange PDUs datagram’s between two entities on the network. These services, 
implemented by the MAC layer, can be divided into two system categories [48]: 
  
 Station services. Includes distribution of PDUs to STA, involving services like 
authentication, deauthentication, authorization and privacy. 
 
 Distribution System Services. These services include association, disassociation, 
distribution and reassociation. 
 
These services are required to provide necessary functionality between stations (STAs) and 
access points (AP) in order to send and receive data packets. This is also where security issues 
raises, because availability aspects require adequate levels of security to be implemented to 
ensure STA and network privacy. As described in figure 7, IEEE 802.11 state machine has 
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three existing states between source and destination. The first state occurs when a STA 
activates the wireless network card (WNC) and appears unauthenticated and unassociated 
with the AP. The STA will then transmit an authentication request to the AP, and the AP will 
respond with an authentication challenge. If the STA is able to figure out the correct 
challenge-response, the STA will move into state 2. This state indicates that the STA has 
passed authentication successfully. In state 3 the STA tries to associate with the AP. The 
association process maps the STA to the distribution system (DS) in order to establish a 
connection and obtain network connectivity. Often the DS requires a second authentication 
process to access local DS network services. Figure 7 shows an overview of the general 
association process of STA’s requesting services from the AP and until the association is 
granted and network access is obtained.  
  
Figure 7: Basic WLAN association 
 
For the authentication and association process the STA and AP uses control frames and 
management frames. Referred to [48], the transition process shown in figure 7 can be 
reviewed in figure 8 as the following combination frame-state:  
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Figure 8: The association process and frame types 
 
Because of the radio frequency availability, the association process must be securely 
protected. In other words, security mechanisms must to be implemented in order prevent 
unauthorized devices from accessing and compromising the wireless system. Before we look 
into security protocols and improvements, I would like to introduce an overview of threats 
and vulnerabilities considering IEEE 802.11 infrastructure networks. These threats are the 
basis for what security mechanisms and functionalities which are required to fully secure a 
wireless network environment. The next section introduces WLAN threats and security 
challenges.   
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2.4 WLAN threats and security challenges 
Referred to [20] there are different threat levels depending on the application area, the system 
operation and the attached employment. The threat picture connected to a WLAN deployment 
needs to be considered as a consequence of a threat evaluation and an estimated vulnerability 
analysis. Such an evaluation is out of the scope of this thesis, but in a security manner it is 
important that the different threats can be addressed through implementation of security 
mechanisms and functionality.  
2.4.1 Threat levels and definitions  
To analyze security in wireless networks we need to define the threats, vulnerabilities and 
potential attacks. Because of the local availability aspects, there are lots of uncertain security 
issues and riskiness concerning employments of wireless IEEE 802.11 networks; especially 
for networks providing access to classified information. According to [20] there are three 
threat levels defined; low threat, medium threat and high threat. Because of the radio access 
availability aspects, and accordingly that a wireless 802.11 network is available outside 
controlled area as well inside controlled area, there exist a certain high threat appreciation 
connected to WLAN deployments. This signifies that wireless LAN systems should be 
capable of handling availability aspects and address security issues before it may be 
implemented into real-time classified systems. 
2.4.2 Wireless threat aspects  
Entities operating within in a wireless network are basically concerned with the same threats 
as any other devices connected to local area networks (LAN’s). In addition, wireless network 
communication is physically available and therefore introduces several security challenges 
and vulnerabilities. The following section presents the most relevant threats and vulnerability 
aspects related to wireless networks.  
2.4.2.1 Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping is when someone secretly listens to some others conversation [26]. 
Because of radio waves availability, an attacker can passively monitor wireless network 
communication without being detected. Confidentiality mechanisms are required to 
prevent against eavesdropping threats.   
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2.4.2.2 Monitoring and traffic analysis 
Attackers passively or actively monitor wireless transmission to identify patterns, 
architectures, participators, and network/security configurations in order to map a network 
overview. This information can be used to find the weakest point in defense and to adjust 
potential attacking techniques.      
2.4.2.3 Brute force attack 
Because of eavesdropping and radio access availability aspects, attackers can use brute 
force methods to compromise data-encryption, to recover cryptographic keys and to 
formulate plaintext data. This demonstrates that encryption technology used in wireless 
networks must be well founded and approved mechanisms which are well protected 
against brute forces mechanisms.     
2.4.2.4 Man-in-the-Middle attack 
In a Man-in-the-Middle attack the attacker actively intercepts the communication path 
between two legitimate parties, to obtain credentials and data. The goal is to use 
cryptographic keying materials, passwords or other authentication credentials that it 
receives, to gain access to the wireless network. IEEE 802.11 networks are particularly 
vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle attacks because of the radio communication availability, 
and such attacks can be achieved through bogus [9] or rough access points, which intends 
to act as authorized devices.  
2.4.2.5 Message modification and replay attacks 
Because of availability aspects it is possible for attackers to modify legitimate messages 
sent over wireless network, for example in direction of a Man-in-the-Middle attack. 
Messages can be modified by deleting, adding or changing the packet content. In IEEE 
802.11 networks this is a relevant problem for messages sent over the air in plaintext and 
without any integrity protection (MIC). Authenticity and integrity protection methods can 
prevent against modification by detecting the origin of and changes to packet content. 
Replays intends to record series of frames and packets, for example authentication 
messages, to replay them to gain access to the network. Such attacks can be avoided using 
packet counters, signatures and counter integrity protection (MIC). 
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2.4.2.6 Spoofing and masquerading attacks 
Spoofing and masquerading is related to attackers that try to impersonate authorized 
devices, for example to fake the origin of packets in order to achieve various advantages. 
Another example is attackers that modify (fake) the MAC address [28], which is currently 
a WLAN security problem. A MAC-changing tool such as SimpleMAC [79] is free 
software which can be used to spoof MAC addresses. Spoofing and masquerading are 
often used in combination with other attacks like Man-in-the-Middle and Session 
hijacking.   
2.4.2.7 Session hijacking attack 
This type of attack intents to take control over legitimate sessions by using authorized 
devices to gain access to the wireless networks. In a typical Session Hijacking attack the 
attacker receives the challenge response from a legitimate AP, which is forwarded to a 
legitimate STA. The legitimate STA encrypt and respond to the challenge, and the 
attacker uses the STA-response to authenticate. The legitimate STA receives a log off 
message from the attacker to prevent suspiciousness. To prevent this irreversible 
authenticity methods are required to avoid accomplishment of session hijacking attacks.       
 
2.4.2.8 Rogue access points, rough clients and phishing attacks  
Rogue access points (AP) and rogue clients (STA’s) are unauthorized devices which 
infiltrate the wireless network area attempting to connect and associate with the 
authorized system. Rogue devices are typical low cost and SOHO products [27] which are 
brought in by employees or visitors. STA’s may automatically try to connect to a rough 
access point if it accidental uses the same SSID. For attackers rogue access points and 
rough clients can detect authentication credentials, cryptographic key materials and 
request/responses in order to compromise the wireless system. Rogue AP and STA’s are 
also described as phishing attacks [74] where the intention is to impersonate legitimate 
devices and lure clients to connect to it. Wireless control, detection and active protection 
mechanisms are required to prevent rough devices from infiltrating the wireless network 
area.  
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2.4.2.9 Denial of Service (DOS) and flooding attacks 
Attackers may try to prohibit devices and wireless components to degrade network 
performance. Such attacks are meant to disrupt wireless networking by sending more 
requests than the network devices can handle [25]. These types of attacks can cause 
network downtime and loss of productivity. For wireless LAN such attack often assails 
the basic IEEE 802.11 protocol to exploit flaws and to overload network devices. Dos 
attacks can be directed towards STA’s as well as access points (AP) and in a wireless 
context it can be difficult to find the inducing source. Flooding [9] is similar to DOS 
attacks and involves sending large numbers of messages to an access point to avoid other 
STA’s to access the wireless channel. This is a difficult security area which requires well 
founded security protocols to be established. In addition data flow control is required to 
detect abnormalities and to protect network devices.    
2.4.2.10 RF Jamming attacks 
RF jamming [9] involves using electromagnetic energy to interfere within the WLAN 
frequency area. Jamming intends to interrupt WLAN services and disturb communication. 
Jamming and radio disturbance may origin from deliberating or unconscious sources for 
example; neighbor WiFi networks, microwaves, wireless jamming products [65, 67] or 
other interfering radio systems. Jamming attacks are very difficult to handle and all type 
of radio networks are vulnerable to frequency disturbances. Wireless radio frequency (RF) 
control mechanisms and location services can potentially be used to locate jamming 
devices from where they can be physically removed.   
 
Based on these attacks and vulnerabilities security protocols and mechanisms are required to 
meet the threats in order to establish reliable and secure wireless communication services. In 
the next section I will introduce WLAN security aspects and mechanisms related to access 
control, confidentiality and availability and take a closer look at protocol improvements that 
have been done to safeguard wireless networking. 
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2.5 Overview of IEEE 802.11 WLAN security 
Security in wireless LAN’s (WLAN’s) have been discussed widely since the introduction of 
the IEEE 802.11 standard (Wi-Fi) in 1997 [8]. To improve security in wireless LANs, 
protocols like IEEE 802.1X and IEEE 802.11i has been proposed to provide access control 
and confidentiality respectively. In addition, availability aspects concerning WLAN networks 
have introduced several security challenges which for high assurance networks must be 
addressed. This section provides a brief historical overview of fundamental security protocols 
and mechanisms which intend to meet the threats and vulnerabilities as introduced in section 
2.4. Access control introduces IEEE 802.1X, confidentiality introduces IEEE 802.11i, and 
availability introduces control, detection and protection facilities.    
2.5.1 Access Control 
The goal of access control [5] is to ensure that sensitive data can be accessed only by 
authorized users. The basic IEEE 802.11 specification defines two ways to identify wireless 
devices attempting to access WLANs resources; Open system authentication and Shared key 
authentication. IEEE 802.11 standard requires that the open system authentication is 
supported, while the shared key authentication is optional. The open system authentication 
mechanism identifies the following information:  
 
 Service Set Identifier (SSID) for the Access point 
SSID is the specified identification name assigned to the WLAN. This name is 
broadcasted in over the air in clear text, and is used to distinguish different WLAN’s.   
 
 Media Access Control (MAC) Address for the devices 
MAC address [11] is a unique value associated with the network adapter. This value 
consists of 48 bits and is also known as the physical address assigned any network 
interface.  
 
Open system authentication is basically a null authentication mechanism, and does not 
authenticate any device that connects to the AP. Therefore STAs have to trust communication 
based on the SSID. This can be misused easily and is no assurances for any identities. Shared 
key authentication is based on a secret cryptographic key, known as Wired Equivalent Privacy 
(WEP), which is considered as an extremely weak and flawed confidentiality mechanism [9]. 
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A secret WEP key is shared between AP and STA on order to access the wireless network. 
Shared key authentication uses a simple challenge-response message to determine and 
authorize the STA. Each STA has to know the WEP key to be able to answer the challenge 
and thereby access the network. Shared key authentication is not a secure authentication 
because the AP can not decide if the STA is legitimate or not. Thereby, standard access 
control solutions for IEEE 802.11 networks are extremely vulnerable for exploitations. In 
other words, external access control mechanisms are needed to assure a secure authentication 
and association process.  
 
In general there are three aspects of an authentication process [3]; access to the basestation, 
access to the wireless network and access to the local area network (LAN). Figure 9 show 
these challenges concerning secure wireless access control and access to wired LAN 
resources. 
 
Figure 9: Wireless client authentication before it gains access to other LAN resources. 
 
In order to ensure secure authentication the 802.11X standard has been purposed, offering 
port-based network access control. A port in this context is a single point off attachment in 
reaching the LAN infrastructure. As we can see from figure 9, a STA (laptop) requests 
WLAN access by probing the AP. The AP will ask for some STA identification, which the 
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STA has to return to the AP. The AP, which in this case acts as the authenticator, unpacks the 
message and forwards it to an authentication server (RADIUS). As session number 2 in figure 
9 shows, the authentication server will decide if the STA is authorized to access and associate 
with the wireless network. During the authentication process only the authentication protocol 
is enabled for access, all other ports are closed. This means that after authorization a certain 
communication port will open up and allow the STA to establish a secure connection to 
distribution system (LAN area).  
 
The authentication process as shown figure 9 may include use of various types of protocols. 
Different set of rules and algorithms can be established depending on the environment, the 
configuration and the level of security. To build a secure system it is important to analyze the 
user range, the protocols and the environment. Based on such evaluation and in relation to the 
requirements, the goal is to establish an appropriate solution. However, improper 
authentication can undermine all security measures. The IEEE 802.11X [9] standard is a 
general purpose and an extensible framework to authenticate user as well as distributions of 
cryptographic keys. Mainly there are two types of authentication schemes; Pre-shared-key 
(PSK) which is based on a shared secret, or using the Extensible authentication protocol 
(EAP), which makes it possible to authenticate user based on something you know 
(username/password etc.) or something you have (smartcard, certificate etc.). Using an EAP 
solution requires the authentication process to be closely evaluated, and there exists some 
EAP protocols that are considered insecure [9]. On the other hand EAP may be an effective 
way to authenticate users, especially for larger networks. Using a PSK authentication scheme 
requires more administration because each STA in the system needs to be continually aware 
of the shared secret.  It is also possible to combine EAP and PSK in terms of enhanced 
security configurations. One main concernment is the question to allow some authentication 
messages to be sent in clear text or not. A PSK scheme could prevent this by providing a 
temporal encryption start key. Chapter 3 will discuss and analyze IEEE 802.1X standard and 
combinations of EAP protocol mechanisms to find potential access control mechanisms to be 
used for high assurance wireless networks.    
 
2.5.2 Confidentiality and integrity 
Confidentiality [13] involves how to ensure that transmitted data can be received and 
understood only by the intended and the authorized audience, whereas integrity [10] intends 
 Agder University College Faculty of Engineering and Science 
  31 
to prohibit unauthorized writing. Confidentiality is often associated with encryption 
technologies by hiding information using cryptographic keys with cryptographic algorithms. 
Integrity is often familiar with cryptographic hash functions, which intents to produce an 
irreversible cryptographic checksum [10] to verify changes to transferred data. As mentioned 
in section 2.5.1 the IEEE 802.11 standard defines the WEP protocol to ensure user 
confidentiality and integrity for over-the-air data transmission. The WEP protocol uses a RC4 
stream cipher algorithm [10], which is remarkably simple. Basically the RC4 algorithm 
consists of a look up table containing permutations of a 256 byte value. An initialization 
vector (IV) of 24 bit is used to initialize the cryptographic stream key. Based on the IV, which 
unfortunately is sent over the air in clear text, enables the basic starting point of the data 
encryption phase. This encryption scheme is vulnerable because an eavesdropper, by the 
advance of the initialization vector, can monitor the network and analyze a relative small 
amount of data to recover the key. To ensure integrity to messages transmitted, the IEEE 
802.11 standard suggests the use of a 32 bit cyclic redundancy check (CRC-32). CRC-32 [14] 
is a binary check sum which consists of a data calculation before and after transmission. 
Basically CRC is particular good at detecting common errors caused by noise added during 
transmission. As an integrity check CRC-32 is a pore solution because attackers that monitor 
the wireless network can easily change both the message and the CRC-32 checksum to order 
to change data without being detected.  In other words the standard IEEE 802.11 protocol 
does not include any secure confidentiality solutions for over-the-air transmission. To 
improve this we need to add new cryptographic algorithms and integrity mechanisms that are 
capable of securing the amount of data being transported.  
2.5.2.1 Robust Security Networks (RSN)  
The IEEE 802.11i [3, 9] standard introduces a new baseline for confidentiality and integrity in 
wireless networks. The IEEE 802.11i standard was ratified in June 2004 introducing new 
mechanisms to fix all WEP weaknesses, and propose a security configuration which appeals 
to Robust Security Networks (RSN) [9] configurations. The IEEE 802.11i standard defines 
three basic elements to enhance security in wireless networks.  
 
 Temporary Key Integrity protocol (TKIP)  
 Counter Mode with the CBC-MAC protocol (CCMP) 
 802.11X port based network access control configuration  
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TKIP is basically an improvement of the WEP protocol and the RC4 algorithm. The intention 
is to increase confidentiality and integrity without requiring new hardware replacement. 
Among other things TKIP introduces a pr frame encryption key change and a new message 
integrity code (MIC) which is fundamental security improvements. On the other hand TKIP 
protocol has revealed some weak points [9] that under some conditions may be easily 
exploited by an attacker, as shown in the following video [50].  
 
The Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code protocol 
(CCMP) is a new confidentiality and integrity framework which requires new hardware both 
for access points (AP) and for stations (STA’s). The CCMP protocol introduces a “generic 
authenticated encryption block chipper mode“ [9] of the Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) that combines two well known and founded cryptographic techniques to provide robust 
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. The Counter mode (CRT) is used for integrity and 
the CBC-MAC protocol are used both for integrity and message authentication (Authenticity). 
The CCMP protocol is considered to be the most secure low layered protocol solution for use 
in WLAN.    
 
The IEEE 802.11i uses 802.11X (EAP protocol) to provide mutual authentication between 
STA’s and the WLAN infrastructure. The IEEE 802.11i introduces some techniques from the 
internet protocol security (IPSec) standard (see section 2.6) and generates cryptographic 
checksums based on a hash message authentication code (HMAC) [9]. Figure 10 shows an 
overview of basic IEEE 802.11 security and 802.11i (RSN) security.   
 
Figure 10: Overview of 802.11 security protocol configurations 
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As mentioned, the IEEE 802.11i standard introduces the concept of Robust Security Network 
(RSN) [9], which is also referred to as the WPA2 standard. The RSN allows a creation of 
Robust Security Network Association (RSNA) which is a security relationship established 
trough a 4-way handshake process. This 4-way handshake protocol requires the entities to 
possess a Pairwise Master Key (PMK), and is responsible to confirm ciphers suits and 
temporal key distributions. The 4-Way handshake will be closely described in chapter 4. The 
RSNA [9] enables the following features of robust WLAN security: 
 
 Enhanced user authentication mechanisms  
 Cryptographic key management 
 Data confidentiality 
 Data authenticity and integrity 
 Replay protection  
 
To achieve robust security the 802.11i standard introduces numbers of cryptographic 
algorithms and techniques. These algorithms can be categorized to solve different security 
problems to ensure confidentiality and integrity in wireless networks.    
 
Figure 11: Cryptograpic algorithms used in IEEE 802.11 networks 
 
Figure 11 shows some of the amendment referred to IEEE 802.11i cryptographic algorithms. 
The keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) [52] is widely used to provide 
integrity and confidentiality solutions. HMAC is a cryptographic hash function which 
calculates a message authentication code in combination with a secret key. In other words, 
HMAC can be used to both verify data integrity and to ensure message authenticity. To 
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calculate a HMAC the SHA-1 algorithm [52] can be used. The Secure Hash algorithm (SHA) 
is a public announced and FIPS approved algorithm which with a high degree of probability 
produces a unique value of given data input. Referred to [53] the SHA-1 algorithm has not 
been broken or compromised. The HMAC-MD5 algorithm is a hash function which is very 
similar to the SHA-1. The major practical difference is that MD5 [10] produces a 128-bit 
output, whereas SHA-1 produces a 180-bit output. According to [10, 53] MD5 is not longer 
considered secure because collisions have been found, which indicates that the algorithm is 
possible to break. Referred to figure 11, not all available and used cryptographic algorithms 
are shown. For example other key generation algorithms using the EAP protocol may be 
implemented for particular solutions. Referred to RFC-1750 [51], which discusses the 
generation of randomness related to key establishment, key generation techniques are 
extremely important elements in building confidentiality and integrity solutions, especially for 
wireless networks. In chapter 4 I will discuss confidentiality, integrity and key generation 
mechanisms more in detail.         
 
The IEEE 802.11i standard suggest to combine CCMP, using AES-CRT and AES 
CBC_MAC together with the 802.11X protocol to increase robustness and security in wireless 
networks. RSN and 802.11i are interesting and promising approaches to build secure wireless 
solutions. In chapter 4 I will continue the discussion security improvements of the RSN and 
the IEEE 802.11i standards, focusing on the CCMP encryption and integrity mechanisms. 
 
2.5.2.2 Cryptographic key hierarchies, generation and key management 
Cryptographic keys are used to provide confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. This means 
that cryptographic keys are used in both the authentication process (IEEE 802.1X) and in the 
confidentiality process (IEEE 802.11i). Consequently a hierarchy of cryptographic keys arises 
and a subsequent process to handle and control the keys is required. This process is called key 
management [9] which is responsible for handling the keys and related materials during the 
key component lifetime including generating, distributing, storing and destroying. Since 
cryptography is a security foundation, it is essential to keep the keys concealed from 
outsiders. Therefore keys needs to be protected and ensured to prevent the security 
configuration form being compromised.  The IEEE 802.11i standard introduces two types of 
hierarchies to handle and safeguard the key management system. The first key hierarchy is the 
Pairwise Key Hierarchy as shown in figure 12, which organizes a key structure indenting to 
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protect unicast data traffic. The second key hierarchy is the Group Key Hierarchy which is 
used to protect multicast and broadcast data exchange. As we can se from figure 12, there are 
two fundamental keys on top of the hierarchy, a pre-shared key (PSK) and an Authentication, 
Authorization and Accounting key (AAAK), also referred to as the root keys [9]. PSK is a 
static key which must be in place at the STA before a connection to the AP can be established. 
The PSK can be manually distributed through USB devices or smartcards, or generated and 
installed using public key cryptographic [63] approaches. The AAA key, also known as the 
Master Session Key (MSK), is used to authenticate and authorize the STA and the AP in order 
to establish an RSNA connection. A centralized RADIUS server is used to perform the 
approvals. The AAA key is a session key delivered through the EAP protocol, and the key 
changes each time the STA has to reauthenticate. The AAA key is generated and installed 
using the EAP mechanisms, which will be closer described and discussed in chapter 3.  
              
 
Figure 12: IEEE 802.11i pairwies key hierarchy[ [9] 
The PSK and the AAAK, are both required to provide additional keys in order ensure several 
of the confidentiality and integrity protections processes. As we can see from figure 12, the 
PSK and AAAK inputs and formulates the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) which is generally a 
key-generation key used for the derivation of the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK). A pseudo 
random function (PRF) using the HMAC-SHA-1 is used to generated PTK. The PTK inputs 
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are based on the PMK, the STA identity (MAC address), and a random nonce which suppose 
to prevent outsiders from calculating the key. The PTK is composed with three different 
important keys. The EAP over LAN Key Confirmation Key (EAPOL-KCK) are used to 
provide confidentiality and integrity to the IEEE 802.11 control frames which is used to 
establish and setup IEEE 802.11i connections. The EAPOL Key encryption Key (EAPOL-
KEK) is used to protect cryptographic keys and other RSNA materials. The Temopral Key 
(TK) is used to protect particular data transmission and user traffic. Table 3, shows a 
summary of cryptographic keys that will be closer discussed in chapter 3 and 4.    
 
Key name Description Purpose Bit-size Key-type 
 
AAAK 
(MSK) 
Authentication, 
Authorization 
and Accounting 
key, the Master 
Session Key 
Used for the 802.1X 
authentication and 
authorization. 
Derives the PMK. 
 
≥256 
 
Root key and key 
generation  
 
PSK 
 
Pre-shared Key 
Key is required to 
establish AP 
connection. Used to 
derive the PMK:  
 
256 
 
Root key and key 
generation  
 
 
PMK 
 
Pairwise Master 
Key  
Master key generated 
from PSK and 
AAAK. Used with 
other inputs to derive 
the PTK 
 
 
265 
 
 
Key generation 
key 
 
GMK 
 
Group Master 
Key  
Same as PMK, used 
in multicast and 
broadcast network 
transmissions  
 
128 
 
Key generation 
key 
 
 
PTK 
 
 
Pairwise 
Transient Key 
Generated from 
PMK and comprises 
the EAPOL-KCK 
and EAPOL-KEK 
and TK  
 
512 (TKIP) 
384 CCMP) 
 
Composite key 
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TK 
 
 
Temporal Key 
Used with the CCMP 
or the TKIP 
algorithm provide 
confidentiality and 
integrity protection 
 
256 (TKIP) 
128 (CCMP) 
 
Traffic key 
 
 
GTK 
 
 
Group 
Temporal Key 
Generated from 
GMK. Same as TK 
but used in 
multicast/broadcast 
networks. 
 
256 (TKIP) 
128 (CCMP) 
 
Traffic key 
 
MIC key 
 
Message 
Integrity Code 
Key  
Used by TKIP to 
provide message 
integrity protection 
using a Michael MIC 
 
64 
 
Message integrity 
key 
 
 
EAPOL-KCK 
 
 
EAPOL Key 
Confimation 
Key 
Used to provide 
integrity protection 
for control frames 
data distributed 
during the 4-Way 
Handshake 
 
128 
 
Message integrity 
key 
 
EAPOL-KEK 
 
EAPOL Key 
Encrytion  
Key 
Used to ensure 
confidentiality for 
other  key material 
distributed  
 
128 
 
Encryption/traffic 
key 
Table 3: IEEE 802.11i keys [9] used for confidentiality, integrity and authenticity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5.3 Availability 
Access control, confidentiality and integrity are all very important aspects in developing 
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secure wireless communication systems. On the other hand such mechanisms and 
implementations are not enough to safeguard and control a wireless LAN environment. 
Availability has two major concerns, one which includes the fact that system equipment, 
protocols and technology are available to outsiders and possible attackers; another concern is 
the network and the signals which are available for authorized users as well as unauthorized 
user. Because of the availability aspects there are several obvious threats and vulnerabilities to 
a WLAN infrastructure. Some of these wireless threats, as described in section 2.4, can be met 
through secure access control solutions and cryptographic technology, as introduced in 
section 2.5.1 and 2.5.2. If we look at the different threats from section 2.5 we may conclude 
that not all the vulnerabilities and threats can be addressed. Examples are denial of service 
(DOS) and flooding attacks, which potentially can turn down AP’s or STA’s in order to 
degrade network performance. Other typical threats which can not be handled are the 
presence of rogue devices that infiltrates the network area, and jamming which interferes with 
WLAN frequencies. To meet these vulnerabilities we need to implement a set of security tools 
that can observe and supervise the wireless environment and report if some undesirable 
situations occur. At the same time the observation system must be able to respond to sudden 
occurrences, attacks and threats that emerge. In other words, it is required to add 
“environmental control” and mechanisms that are capable to monitor, control, detect and 
protect the wireless environment against intruders and suspicious behavior. 
 
2.5.3.1 Wireless environmental control using wireless sensor devices 
Wireless environmental control involves the ability to observe and guard the wireless network 
to increase trust and to give administrators the opportunity to reveal irregularities. A wireless 
monitor system which implements passive and active sensor devices may potentially 
supervise and protect the wireless network. The sensor target is to capture PHY/MAC frames 
and transmit them to a detection system.  Figure 13 shows an overview of a monitoring 
system architecture implemented using wireless sensor devices (monitor Access Points).   
 Agder University College Faculty of Engineering and Science 
  39 
 
Figure 13: WLAN monitoring system principal architecture 
 
Based on a wireless monitoring system, intrusion detection technology [72] can be 
implemented to detect unwanted wireless activity. Such activity can be unauthorized devices 
that intend to connect and access the network, emerging rogue devices (AP/STA), denial of 
service attacks, flooding attacks or simply disturbance/interruptions that affect the wireless 
network performance. Research [73, 74, 75] has concluded that wireless sensor based systems 
have many potential goals that could increase security for enterprise wireless solutions, 
especially for high assurance wireless environments. Wireless monitoring and capability 
aspects will be presented and discussed in chapter 5. As introduced in [75], a wireless monitor 
system can be used for active protection of the wireless network. This is a complicated 
problem scenario because physical aspects of the IEEE 802.11 protocol make it relatively 
easy to destroy wireless connectivity. In chapter 5 the thesis will look into and discuss 
protection mechanisms and models which have potential options to meet some of these 
vulnerabilities.        
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2.5.4 Summary of WLAN security challenges  
As introduced in section 2.5.1, 2.5.2 and 2.5.3, fairly complicated security protocols has been 
adapted to meet security threats in order to apply high-end security requirements for wireless 
networks. To summarize the security prospectives, figure 14 shows an overview of security 
challenges associated with WLAN’s. This scenario encircles the implementation of a wireless 
network, based on the IEEE 802.11 technology, which provides access to a high assurance 
classified information network.   
 
Figure 14: The IEEE 802.11 protocol and security challenges  
As shown in figure 14, the IEEE 802.11 protocol system operates as a link-layer forwarder 
which exchanges OSI-link layer packets between the WiFi network and the DS. To safeguard 
the wireless link we must implement security protocols, such as IEEE 802.1X and IEEE 
802.11i, which inserts access control mechanisms and confidentiality/integrity technology. 
Management and control frames are marked in red because these frames are not protected by 
the IEEE 802.11i security settlement. Because of the wireless availability aspects there are 
challenges connected to the WiFi radio access availability, which means that the WLAN 
network must be controlled and protected against a wide range of wireless threats. As shown 
in figure 14, mechanisms for “environmental control” are required to oblige and cover the 
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different wireless threats and vulnerabilities which can not be achieved by implementing 
802.1X and 802.11i mechanisms. 
 
 
2.6 VPN/IPsec for network-layer security 
VPN/IPSec is not a part of the 802.11 protocol but can be used to provide confidentiality and 
integrity to wireless data transmissions. VPN and IPsec are methods and mechanisms that can 
add network layer (OSI-layer 3) securities to the data transfer. VPN and IPsec are well 
founded and established mechanism that can be used in wireless networks as well as wired 
LAN environments. The main advantage is that layer 3 provides end-to-end security between 
sender and recipient. As case 1 in section 1.4.1.1 describes, IPsec ESP can be used to provide 
confidentiality and integrity, transparently independent of transmission media. In the 
following section we will shortly describe the main functionality of using VPN/IPsec 
solutions in WiFi networks.          
2.6.1 IPsec in wireless networks  
IPsec is an open standard framework [10, 61] which operates on the network layer (layer 3). 
In IEEE 802.11 networks, IPsec can be used to provide confidentiality, authenticity and 
integrity to data packets transferred over the wireless network. The major advantage of the 
IPsec protocol is that it’s transparent to applications and devices as well as access points (AP), 
stations (STA’s) and the wireless environment. This means that an IPsec solution can provide 
IP end-to-end security on the network layer compared to CCMP which only can handle the 
wireless environment and provide security between two entities on the data link (OSI layer 2) 
level.       
2.6.1.1 IPsec ESP 
IPsec ESP is one of several IPsec security protocols protecting IP network communication 
services.  The encapsulating security payload (ESP) is a security protocol which combined 
with IPsec can provide confidentiality, authenticity and integrity to the IP packet. ESP can 
operate in two different modes; transport mode or tunnel mode. In transport mode the ESP 
header is placed between the IP header and the data-field and provides confidentiality to the 
transported data only. In tunnel mode, ESP encrypts the entire IP packet and creates a new IP 
header for each new packet, signifying that the original header is no longer visible for 
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outsiders. This is particular valuable if tunnel mode is used between to firewalls, because 
outsiders monitoring the network can not see which hosts are communicating. A disadvantage 
of the ESP tunnel mode solution is increased overhead for additional IP headers, which in a 
wireless context will degrade throughput performance.                
 
Figure 15: IPsec ESP tunnel mode 
The ESP encryption process offers symmetric block cipher encryption [62] base on the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). ESP uses AES-CBC and AES-CTR algorithms, which 
are similar to the CCMP protocol, or alternatively Triple DES (3DES) encryption.    
2.6.2 Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
VPN [62] is a virtual network integrated on top of an existing network providing secure 
communication channels for IP packets transmitted over unsecured networks.   
 
 
Figure 16: VPN host-gateway configuration 
 
VPN renders three types of architectures; a host-to-gateway architecture as shown in figure 
16, a gateway-to-gateway architecture and a host-to-host architecture. A host-to-gateway 
solution is especially adapted for use in wireless IEEE 802.11 networks, where stations (STA) 
authenticates and operates towards a VPN gateway server. Implementing IPsec with VPN 
involves using both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. Asymmetric crypto, also 
known as public key crypto [63], is used to authenticate both parties (host and VPN-gateway), 
and symmetric crypto is used to ensure confidentiality and integrity for transported data 
packets.    
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3  Access control based on IEEE 802.1X  
This chapter will focus on access control and authentication mechanism to intending to 
provide secure access to a high assurance wireless network. The wireless network is based on 
the IEEE 802.11 standard protocol and by employing the concept of Robust Network Security 
(RSN), I will investigate the standardized port-based protocol IEEE 802.1X together with the 
extensible authentication protocol (EAP). Furthermore I will introduce and discuss access 
control mechanisms, security issues and architectural requirements according to implement a 
best practice access control configuration. RSN networks do not specify or predefine wireless 
security configurations and leaves implementation issues to supplier and customers to find 
appropriate solutions based on stated requirements. This chapter will mainly cover two 
important aspects of access control which considers the discovery phase and the 
authentication phase [9, 23, 41, 42], where the objective is to security map authorized STA’s 
to access the wireless network. Chapter 4 will cover the key management phase, the data 
protection phase and the termination phase.  
 
3.1 Access control operations  
First of all I will start this chapter by introducing the general frame exchange model 
represented by Robust Security Networks (RSN) described in [9]. RSN operations occur in 
five different phases, where some of the phases are familiar with the general standard IEEE 
802.11 association process described in section 2.3.3. The goal of the five phases is to 
securely map and interconnect authorized STAs to the WLAN network and furthermore 
associated the STA’s with the distribution system and computer networks connected to the 
wired LAN environment. Figure 17 shows the five operational phases. The network 
association process is basically split into two parts, where the first part is a network 
association phase with the wireless IEEE 802.11 network, providing access to the local wired 
LAN infrastructure. The second part is STA association process with the local distribution 
systems, which requires the STA to authenticate and associate with high assurance classified 
application services and data systems. That phase is out of the scope of this thesis and will not 
be covered in this document. The following chapter will present the discovery phase and the 
authentication phase.  
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Figure 17: The RSN association process 
 
 Phase 1: Discovery. The access point (AP) and STA’s use beacons signals and probe 
request to announce their existence and to communicate the security policy.  
 Phase 2: Authentication. The authentication process requires that both STA and the 
authentication server (AS) prove their identities to each other. The AP blocks all STA 
traffic except from authentication transactions. The AP does not participate in the 
authentication process except from forwarding authentication messages between 
STA’s and the AS.    
 Phase 3: Key Management. AP and STAs performs operations which generate, 
distribute and handle cryptographic keys, as described in chapter 2. The key exchange 
frames are exchanged between STA and the corresponding AP only, and uses the EAP 
protocol for protection. This phase will be handled in chapter 4.    
 Phase 4: Protected Data Transfer. To protect the data frames being exchanged 
between STA and AP, cryptographic algorithms provides secure wireless data transfer. 
An important signification is that security is only insured for wireless traffic and not 
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end-to-end. This phase will be described and handled in chapter 4.  
 Phase 5: Connection termination. This phase occurs when the wireless connection is 
terminated. This involves that the termination process should restore to the initial 
state. This phase will be described in chapter 4.  
3.1.1 The discovery phase 
The first stage of the discovery phase is when the STA discovers the wireless network and 
initiates contact with access point (AP). To locate the AP, the STA listens to beacon frames 
which are periodically is broadcasted by the AP to communicate its network identity. The 
Beacon frame contains a timestamp, a beacon interval, supported data rates, and a service set 
identifier (SSID). To distinguish different AP’s within the same radio coverage area, the STA 
conducts to the SSID configuration. This indicates that the first initial conversation-request 
performed by STA’s, depends on the reliability and the trust of the beacon SSID broadcast 
message. In other words, a STA will automatically try to associate with a wireless network 
operating on an approved SSID identity.  
 
Figure 18: The discovery phase 
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During the discovery phase the STA and the AP exchange and negotiate physical-layer (OSI-
layer one) technical prospects to be able to establish a reliable communication channel. This is 
prospects related to radio communication parameters, modulation schemes, coding, channel 
settings etc. To be able to establish a secure connection between the STA and the AP, it is 
necessary to negotiate security configuration data, informing each party what type of security 
setup that should be established. This security exchange implies informing the AP and the 
STA about available security capabilities and supported security functionalities, such as 
authentication methods, confidentiality protocols, key management and integrity protocols.  
As described in [9], the security capability broadcast message includes a RSN information 
element, which is part of the AP’s beacon broadcast and the STA’s probe request frame.  
 
Figure 19: RSN information element (RSNIE) [9] 
As shown in figure 19, the Robust Security Network Information Element (RSNIE) fields 
conveys and informs STA’s about required security settings, which includes required key 
cipher suites, authentication and key management suites and other security capabilities. The 
STA will have to meet the security claims to be able to authenticate with the AP and wireless 
network. In figure 20, the discovery frame sequence is shown, demonstrating the AP and STA 
association process before authentication. This phase is vulnerable because neither the STA 
nor the AP is able to confirm the other parts identity. This signifies that message between AP 
and STA are based on simple trust. The STA requests to connect to the preferred SSID 
network and the AP which match the SSID probe request will respond. Furthermore, the STA 
and AP will go through a null authentication process (open system authentication described in 
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section 2.5.1) as shown in figure 20. This authentication process simply maps the two wireless 
entities according to the 802.11 state machine described in section 2.3.3, to maintain 
backward compatibility to the with IEEE 802.11 hardware [9]. The STA will then try to 
associate with the AP and wireless network by satisfying the claims and the selected security 
mechanisms and parameters. If the STA can not meet the security claims requested, the AP 
will automatically refuse the association request and block the STA communication based on 
the MAC address. The STA will also block the AP, in case of a rough access point, or if the 
AP do not meet the STA security requirements.    
 
Figure 20: The discovery frame sequence process before 802.1X authentication  
 
We may already conclude that the security configuration policy enabled within the wireless 
environment is available for anyone monitoring the network. Based on the IEEE 802.11 
standard it is not possible to hide security configuration, and any outsiders within the wireless 
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covering area can passively monitor AP beacon frames to map the security policy and 
parameters. It is possible, as shown in figure 18, to turn of AP beacon broadcasting, but the 
probe-request and probe-response exchange advertises the same security information for 
entities monitoring the network. A wireless network configured for RSN, IEEE 802.1X for 
authentication and AES-CCMP for unicast and broadcast traffic, will automatically refuse to 
communicate with STA’s or AP that cannot meet the security configuration policy. Even 
though this is not a particular increasing security factor which certainly demonstrates that 
security algorithms, cryptographic mechanisms and key-management is the key to establish a 
safe and secure wireless network. Although, every STA and AP within a RSN network has to 
accomplish an authentication process before they can associate with wireless network. As 
figure 20 indicates, the 802.1X control port is closed until the STA can meet the security 
requirements. Based on the STA security conditions the AP will open up the 802.1X 
uncontrolled port, permitting the STA to start the authentication phase.  
3.1.2 The authentication phase 
After succeeding the discovery phase the STA and the AP enters the authentication phase. 
According to an RSN configuration, the AP does not participate during the authentication 
process, but only forwards frames and is responsible to open a communication port to allow 
the STA to exchange authentication frames with an authentication server (AS). The AS and 
STA has to prove their identity before the AP will allow other traffic and access to 
WLAN/LAN resources.  
 
Figure 21 : Authentication phase 
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The authentication phase is a security critical process which supposes to prevent unauthorized 
STA’s and AP’s from accessing the wireless network. During the discovery phase the STA 
and the AP can not resolve if the other part is legitimate or not. Therefore the authentication 
process is extremely important, and improper authentication mechanisms may undermine the 
overall security.          
3.1.2.1 IEEE 802.1X framework and concepts   
As mentioned in section 2.4.1, the IEEE 802.11 standard uses the IEEE 802.1X frame work to 
provide secure network access control. As described in [54, 9], he IEEE 802.1X standard is an 
extensible frame work, which uses port-based network access control mechanisms to carry 
through the authentication and authorization process of wireless network devices. The IEEE 
802.1X allow a STA to communicate via an authenticator (AP) trough a single point-to-point 
connection, preventing access to all other logical ports except those used for authentication 
services. As shown in figure 22, the authentication server is usually placed in the wired LAN 
environment, and communicates with the STA through a single AP authentication port 
(Uncontrolled Port).     
 
Figure 22: IEEE 802.1X port based access control modell, used in 802.11 networks [55] 
The uncontrolled port as shown in figure 22, allows IEEE 802.1X traffic to be exchanged, and 
of the result from the mutual authentication process, the STA and AS set their controlled port 
to either authorized or unauthorized state. As explained in [54], the IEEE 802.1X standard 
provides an own protocol to exchanging authentication credentials. Depending on the 
outcome of this protocol, and the control state of both STA and AS, and the authenticator 
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(AP) determines to open the controlled port. On the other side the 802.1X protocol does not 
specify any authentication mechanisms or authentication decision method. This is left to 
vendors and system suppliers to implement secure methods which exchanges authentication 
data. Based on this approach, the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) has been 
developed as general authentication exchange framework. Incorporated with the EAP protocol 
several authentication methods are supported. Based on the 802.1X frame work, EAP 
authentication traffic are allowed to pass through the uncontrolled authenticator port, whereas 
non EAP traffic are blocked or passed according the 802.1X authentication state. Based on the 
adopted EAP method, the EAP protocol is designed to securely exchange identity credentials, 
authentication materials and cryptographic keys. Figure 23 shows the relation ship between 
the link layer protocol, the 802.1X frame work and the EAP methods layer.             
  
 
Figure 23: The 802.1X layer relationship 
 
EAP messages which are exchanged between an STA and an AS, must to be securely 
transmitted and strictly controlled. The authentication server (RADIUS) uses a specified 
RADIUS protocol to encapsulate EAP messages, and to safely transmit authentication 
credentials over the LAN interface. For wireless transmission, the EAP messages uses the 
EAP over lan (EAPOL) protocol, as introduced in section 2.5.2.2, which are used to securely 
transmit authentication data between an authenticator (AP) and STA. EAP messages, EAPOL 
frames and RADIUS frames are shown in figure 24.  
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Figure 24: Operations during the authentictaion  phase 
Figure 24 is a continuation of the discovery frame sequences shown in figure 21. The 
authenticator (AP) starts the EAP process initiating an EAP identity request frame. The STA 
will respond with its identity using a EAP probe response, which the authenticator passes on 
to uncontrolled port as a RADIUS-packet posting the authentication, authorization and 
accounting (AAA) RADIUS server.  The RADIUS server and the STA start the 
authentication-challenge process where the RADIUS server initiates with a RADIUS-access-
challenge packet and the STA formulates an EAP-challenge response. The authenticator (AP) 
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is responsible for converting messages between EAP-frames and RADIUS-frames. If the STA 
correctly replies to the challenge, the RADIUS server will inform the AP to let the STA 
access the wireless network. Although, the RADIUS server does not set the controlled port to 
an authorize state until the AP and STA have received and installed temporal encryption keys. 
This means that no network traffic will be entering the DS, before STA’s and AP has installed 
required cryptographic keys. The temporal key exchange process occurs via a 4-way 
handshake protocol, which will be closer described in chapter 4. The cryptographic key result 
from the 4-way handshake is referred to as the AAA root-key, or the master session key 
(MSK), which is used to generate other cryptographic keys, for example to secure the wireless 
communication channel. The cryptographic key is crucial to network security, and 
compromising it could devastate the overall WLAN security system. Referred to figure 22, 
the last frame is an EAP-success message delivered to the STA that enables the STA initiates 
the 4-way handshake process. In the next section I will take a closer look at the EAP protocol, 
EAP methods and EAP requirements according to safely exchange authentication credentials 
and key materials.    
3.2 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) 
To safeguard access control to wireless IEEE 802.11 network a recommended solution has 
been purposed using the 802.1X port based authentication together with the extensible 
authentication protocol (EAP).  EAP was first defined in the IETF RFC 2284 [41] released in 
mars 1998. In June 2004 a second release, RFC 3748 [42], and new and extended version the 
EAP protocol was revised, which considering security, included a new EAP frame work and 
improved interaction with other protocols. EAP supports a wide range of authentication 
methods, called EAP methods [42]. These methods enables authentication based on password, 
certificates, smart cards, tokens or combination of different authentications techniques. EAP 
can also be use to pass trough authenticity, which enables an AP to forward authentication 
messages to and from a backend centralized authentication system. As mentioned in section 
3.1.2.1, the most common protocol to transport EAP authenticity and key distribution 
credentials over LAN is called the RADIUS protocol. A RADIUS solution carries RADIUS 
packets containing EAP conversation in order to accomplish secure system authentication. In 
the next section we will take a look at the different EAP methods and investigate the 
combination of EAP methods and wireless systems requirements for secure access control.   
 Agder University College Faculty of Engineering and Science 
  53 
 
Figure 25: EAP traffic flow [9] 
3.2.1 EAP methods  
EAP provides a flexible link layer security framework, and can run over any link layer 
protocols, for example other 802.X networks like Ethernet. EAP methods perform 
authentication transactions and generate key materials, which is used to protect the 
communication channel. The EAP methods supports many different authentication types, and 
based on [9] there exist about 40 different EAP methods developed for different purposes. In 
this thesis we will only describe some the most relevant and widely supported. One important 
factor is mutual authentication which means that both the STA and the authentication server 
must authenticate each other. This does not necessarily signify symmetric authentication, 
because AP and the client may use different authenticity metods. For example it is possible to 
use a certificate based solution to authenticate the Authentication Server (AS), while the STA 
authenticates using a smartcard, passwords or biometrics. To protect EAP traffic against 
certain attacks, the EAP conversation allows only one EAP method at the time. To support 
multiple EAP sessions an EAP multiplexer/EAP server needs to be implemented. This enables 
multiple of user to authenticate simultaneously, and support functionally to use and 
distinguish several types of EAP conversations. I will not consider security aspects connected 
to multiple EAP conversations in this thesis. Another important EAP issue is EAP tunneling 
techniques which means that several EAP methods dependant on another can be tunneled into 
to same EAP conversation.  
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3.2.2 EAP requirements 
RFC 4017 [44] and RFC 3748 [42] describes security claims and requirements related to EAP 
method development and guides developers in designing new EAP methods for use in 
WLANs. The RFC’s also describe different EAP methods which provide different levels of 
security. To evaluate, compare and to help people to understand the level of security each 
EAP method provides, a security claim list has been composed. This claims list, which can be 
shown in table 4, is based on some important EAP declarations [42]:  
 
1. Mechanisms. This is a statement of authentication technology, for example how 
authentication is performed; certificates, passwords, tokens, smartcard etc.  
2.  Security claims. This is the statements of the claimed security properties of the EAP 
method. These claims are shown in table 4. 
3. Key strength. EAP methods that derive keys, the effective key length must be 
estimated. This means that potential users should be able to determine the strength of 
the key produced and if this is enough for the indented application.  The effective key 
strength depends on the method that is used to derive the keys and therefore users need 
to aware of the quality. For example if a key is derived from a shared secret, for 
example a password, the effective key length can be limited by the strength of the 
password. 
4. Description of the key hierarchy. EAP methods that derive keys must explain and 
describe their relation to the Master Sessions Key (MSKs), the Extended Master 
Session Keys (EMSKs) or refer to the original key hierarchy reference. 
5. Indication of vulnerabilities. Each EAP method must indicate which security claims 
that is not made according to table 4. 
 
Different EAP methods provide different types security features, and for high assurance 
wireless networks, administrators needs to evaluate security conditions and requirements 
before they may implement an appropriate EAP method. On the next page, the EAP claim list 
is presented concerning WLAN security implementation of different EAP metods.  
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3.2.2.1 EAP claim list [44, 42]           
Security claim Requirement Descriptions 
 
 
Protected cipher suite 
negotiation 
 
 
Mandatory 
This refers to the ability of an EAP method 
to negotiate the cipher-suite used to protect 
the EAP conversation, as well as to 
integrity protect the negotiation.  It does 
not refer to the ability to negotiate the 
cipher-suite used to protect data. 
 
 
 
Mutual authentication 
 
 
 
Mandatory 
This refers to an EAP method in which, 
within an interlocked exchange, the 
authenticator authenticates the STA and 
the STA authenticates the authenticator.  
Two in dependent one-way methods, 
running in opposite directions do not 
provide mutual authentication as defined 
here. 
 
Man-in-the-middle attack 
resistance, including 
integrity, replay and session 
protection 
 
 
Mandatory 
This refers to prevent attackers from using 
a WLAN device to proxy communication 
between and STAs and an AP in a 
unauthorized manner. 
 
 
Confidentiality 
 
 
Recommended 
This refers to encryption of EAP messages, 
including EAP Requests and Responses, 
and success and failure result indications.  
A method making this claim MUST support 
identity protection 
 
 
 
Key derivation 
 
 
 
Mandatory 
This refers to the ability of the EAP method 
to derive exportable keying material, such 
as the Master Session Key (MSK), and 
Extended Master Session Key (EMSK). The 
MSK is used only for further key 
derivation, not directly for protection of the 
EAP conversation or subsequent data. Use 
of the EMSK is reserved. 
 
 
Key strength 
 
 
Mandatory 
If the effective key strength is N bits, the 
best currently known methods to recover 
the key (with non-negligible probability) 
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require, on average, an effort comparable 
to 2^(N-1) operations of a typical block 
cipher. 
 
 
 
 
Dictionary attack resistance 
 
 
 
 
Mandatory 
Where password authentication is used, 
passwords are commonly selected from a 
small set (as compared to a set of N-bit 
keys), which raises a concern about 
dictionary attacks.  A method may be said 
to provide protection against dictionary 
attacks if, when it uses a password as a 
secret, the method does not allow an offline 
attack that has a work factor based on the 
number of passwords in an attacker's 
dictionary. 
 
 
Fast reconnect 
 
 
Optional 
The ability, in the case where a security 
association has been previously 
established, to create a new or refreshed 
security association more efficiently or in a 
smaller number of round-trips. 
 
 
 
Cryptographic binding 
 
 
 
 
Mandatory 
The demonstration of the EAP peer to the 
EAP server that a single entity has acted as 
the EAP peer for all methods executed 
within a tunnel method.  Binding MAY also 
imply that the EAP server demonstrates to 
the peer that a single entity has acted as 
the EAP server for all methods executed 
within a tunnel method.  If executed 
correctly, binding serves to mitigate man-
in-the-middle vulnerabilities. 
 
 
Fragmentation 
 
 
 
Recommended 
This refers to whether an EAP method 
supports fragmentation and reassembly.  
EAP methods should support 
fragmentation and reassembly if EAP 
packets can exceed the minimum MTU of 
1020 bytes. 
 
 
Channel binding 
 
 
Optional 
The communication within an EAP method 
of integrity-protected channel properties 
such as endpoint identifiers which can be 
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compared to values communicated via out 
of band mechanisms (such as via a AAA or 
lower layer protocol). 
Table 4: EAP methods claim list for use in WLAN from [44, 42]  
3.2.3 EAP methods based on RFC 3748 
The first EAP methods were introduced and defined in RFC 3748 [42]. This document [42] 
describes three basic EAP models, which are all important security feature and authenticity 
techniques. The main problem with these is that none of them can meet any of the security 
claims described above. These methods need to be combined with other methods, for example 
tunneling and encryption techniques to be able to meet the security requirements.   
 
 EAP MD5-challenge 
The MD5-challenge [9] method is based on the challenge handshake authentication 
protocol (CHAP). The primary advantage of this method is that password or other 
types of authenticity is never transmitted in clear text. The authentication server (AS) 
transmits the challenge-text to the client. The client inputs this challenge-text along 
with a password into the MD5 algorithm and creates a hash value. This value is sent 
back to the AS, which will perform the same operation and compare the two values. 
Unfortunately, this type of challenge response method is vulnerable to offline 
dictionary attacks and man-in-the middle attacks.  Attackers can place them self in 
between AP and clients (STA’s), called man-in-the-middle, in order to capture the 
challenge/response messages. Based on the challenge/response information, an offline 
dictionary attack can be preformed by using the MD5 algorithm to find the correct 
inputs. To prevent this sort of attack, the protocol needs to be carefully designed, 
including sufficient entropy in the challenge, appropriate key length and a strong hash 
function. One possibility is to let the MD5 algorithm to be tunneled within a method 
that encrypts the entire challenges response method. This means that all challenge/ 
response messages will be encrypted and thereby mitigate the risk of man-in-the-
middle attacks.          
 EAP OTP (One time password) 
The One-time-password (OTP) method suggests to use identical OPT generators at the 
client and at the authentication server (AS). These OTP generators use an algorithm to 
produce a unique series of passwords. The algorithm procedure is based on using 
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rounds of secure hash functions combined with random inputs which generates series 
of unique words. The OTP generator may be implemented in hardware or in software, 
but is vulnerable as a stand alone authentication method. As the MD5 challenge, OTP 
needs to be combined with tunneling techniques to mitigate the risk of being attacked.  
 EAP GTC (Generic token card)  
The generic token card is based on a hardware solution, which requires the user to 
input values. An EAP challenge request is send from the AS to the client, where the 
STA  returns a token, based on inputted authentication credentials.   
 
The EAP methods described above has numbers of shortcomings and the most important 
security issue is that these methods do not offer key generation and key material protections. 
Cryptographic keys need to be applied in order to protect traffic between STAs and the AP. In 
other words EAP methods must include other methods than those defined in [42], to safeguard 
authentication and EAP protection. To achieve high level of security EAP methods should be 
based on well known and analyzed key-establishment and key generation techniques. The first 
well established security protocol to be recommended [9] is the Internet Key Exchange 
protocol (IKE) which is commonly used with the Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) to provide 
Virtual Private Networking (VPN). The second recommendation [9] is the Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) which is based on the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) known from secure web 
site communication. Both IKE and TLS use certificates based on Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) [63] to ensure authentication and the transfer of key materials. The IKE and the TLS 
protocol are both founded methods and potential algorithm for use in wireless environments. 
However, TLS has been designed to provide mutual authentication between a authentication 
server and a STA. Based on this, TLS has emerged as the most dominant protocol for building 
access control solutions using EAP methods. TLS uses either a public key certificate or pre-
shared key (PSK) for authentication, and additional EAP methods are tunneled within a TLS 
session. If mutual authentication is required then only the authentication server needs to 
possess a certificate. On the other hand a copy of this certificate needs to be distributed among 
the STA’s in order to verify the authentications server. Below I will discuss some well-known 
EAP methods that have been developed.     
3.2.3.1 EAP-TLS 
EAP-TLS was published in October 1999 [9] and is considered as one of the most secure EAP 
methods. The EAP-TLS method, which is defined in RFC 2716 [46], is today widely 
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supported with varies of products and systems. To be able to obtain mutual authentication 
each STA needs to host its own unique PKI certificate [63], which indicates that organizations 
using EAP-TLS must maintain a public key infrastructure. The certificates may be installed 
on hard disks or in firmware, but as described in [9], the certificates are recommended to be 
stored on a smartcard or physical devices which can be removed from the STAs. A certificate 
which is combined with a physical device also requires users to identify them. This can be 
done by using personal pin-codes, passwords or by using biometric verification. Otherwise, 
the physical device may be easily misused. Implementing PKI certificates [10] also involves a 
certificate policy, practice statements, certificate authorities (CAs), and maintaining a 
certificate revocation list (CRLs) to verify access to the network. It is out of the scope of this 
thesis to discuss PKI in detail, but traditional PKI implementations require considerable 
investments in building infrastructures and resources supplies.   
 
Figure 26: EAP-TLS conversation between STA and the RADIUS server   
TLS is based on the secure socket layer (SSLv3.0) protocol and was basically created as a 
transport-layer (OSI-layer-4) protocol to provide confidentiality, integrity and authenticity 
between two communicating applications. The EAP-TLS protocol implements TLS on the 
link-layer (OSI-layer-2) level in order to ensure communication between two entities as 
shown in figure 26. During the authentication phase the access point (AP) acts as a forwarder 
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between the STA and the authentication server (AS RADIUS). As shown in figure 26, the 
conversation starts with STA sending EAP Response/identity messages to the AP. The AP 
forwards this message to the RADIUS server. The RADIUS server must respond with an EAP 
TLS-start message, which is a request-packet to start a TLS session with corresponding STA. 
The STA responds with a ClientHallo message which contains a client TLS version number, 
sessionID, random number and set of supported client ciphersuites. According to figure 26, 
the RADIUS server responds with a new EAP-Request packet containing its TLS-certificate, 
a STA certificate request, a serverKeyExchange, a change cipher specification and 
serverHallo message. The STA responds with an EAP Response packet and includes its STA 
certificate, change cipher specifications, certificate verification and clientKeyExchange 
message. The clientKeyExchange message is used to complete the exchange of a master 
secret between the STA and the RADIUS server, and this message is encrypted using the AS 
public key. As mentioned in section 2.5.2.2, this secret is referred to as the Master Session 
Key (MSK) or the AAAKey (AAAK). The EAP-TLS conversation ends up with the STA 
signing an EAP-Respons message, whereas the RADIUS returns and EAP-Success packet 
including digital signature if requested.                 
3.2.3.2 EAP-TTLS 
The purpose of the EAP-TTLS method is to extend the EAP- TLS to allow one-way TLS 
authentication to additional provide mutual authentication.  The authentication server (AS) is 
authenticated to the STA using a TLS handshake, which is a one-way authentication process 
creating an encrypted tunnel between the AS and the STA. This tunnel is then used to perform 
a second authentication, where the STA authenticates the AS. The last transaction is called 
inner application [9] and consists of series of attribute-value pairs (AVP). The AVP is 
compatible with the RADIUS message format and specifies the standard protocol and 
supported algorithms. The inner application can also be another EAP method, and is then 
referred to as the inner EAP method [9].  EAP-TTLS operates similar to accessing secure web 
pages, where the STA first validates the authentication server, establishes an encrypted 
session with the server and then transfer user credentials though an encrypted TLS tunnel.  
One big advantage using EAP-TTLS is that the inner application may support many types of 
authentication techniques using them as the inner authentication method. This signifies that 
EAP-TTLS does not require certificates or a public key infrastructure (PKI) to be installed on 
every STA client. On the other hand this might be a weak point in defense because the over 
all authentication security will be based on the strength of the authentication method. If this 
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method is based on user passwords, the strength of the password will affect the overall 
security level. However, EAP-TTLS reduces the administrative complexity since only 
authentication server’s needs to obtain certificates. On the other hand, each client needs to 
verify the AP certificate and therefore the root certificate needs to be securely transferred to 
the client. This opens up for man-in-the-middle attacks and since public key crypto is not 
represented, man-in-the-middle attacks become the shortcomings of using EAP-TTLS 
methods.       
 
3.2.3.3 Protected EAP (PEAP)   
Protected EAP (PEAP)  is a co-operation between Microsoft, Cisco systems and Extundo. 
PEAP is vary similar with the EAP-TTLS based method, and uses certificates only to provide 
AS authenticity to the STAs and thereby establish a secure connection for a communication 
channel to protect further transactions.  As a mandatory security requirement, PEAP requires 
the root certificate to be distributed among the STAs, for secure verification. The main 
difference between EAP-TTLS and PEAP is that PEAP uses another chosen EAP method 
instead of AVPs. This indicates that the authentication method used in PEAP, called the inner 
EAP method, can be any developed and preferred EAP method. PEAP is a well supported 
protocol in Microsoft and Cisco system products, but lacks compatibility with other vendors. 
Unfortunately, Windows XP systems only supports EAP methods like MS-CHAP and MS-
CHAPv2, which based on [9] is considered as insecure, and in addition limited for 
authentication with Microsoft domains or active directory. Another important issue is that 
neither EAP-TTLS nor PEAP have been approve as IETF standards, which signifies that 
implementation using PEAP or EAP-TTLS should be closely evaluated before use.        
3.2.3.4 EAP-FAST 
The last EAP method that I would like to mention is EAP-FAST developed by Cisco systems. 
EAP-FAST uses Protect Access Credential (PAC) to establish an encrypted tunnel for secure 
communication. This establishment is either based on a pre-shared key or public key 
encryption. After a tunnel establishment, an inner EAP method can be used for further 
authentication. Because of PAC, EAP-FAST does not require certificates on AS or STAs. 
Instead Cisco has included a mechanism that refreshes the PACs after each successful 
authentication. Since EAP-FAST does not require a TLS handshake process it provides 
computing advantages which indicates that EAP-FAST is adapted for small devices with less 
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computing power. The problem with EAP-FAST is that establishing a PAC is not more secure 
or easier than using certificates, and often the inner EAP authentication involves digital 
certificates anyway. Therefore EAP-FAST is basically very similar to EAP-TTLS and PEAP. 
Another issue is that Cisco systems is the only vendor supporting the EAP_FAST method, 
and the method has not been official approved as an IETF standard.  
 
 
3.2.4 EAP methods evaluation 
The RSN frame work recommends the IEEE 802.1X standard combined with EAP to ensure 
secure authentication, but implementation details and subsequent claims are left to vendors 
and organizations to implement. Therefore EAP solutions have to be adapted to the preferred 
security configuration. Table 5 displays a review of the different EAP methods and shows 
each method compared to the claim list defined in section 3.2.3.1. As you can se from table 5, 
none of the RFC 3748 methods can meet any of the security requirements, but these methods 
can still be used as and tunneled inner EAP applications. The TLS-based methods differ from 
requiring PKI support to requiring certificates distributed among STAs and APs. This means 
that the preferred EAP method model will depend on the particular network configuration and 
the security requirements. Based on [9] the EAP-TTLS and the PEAP are emerging as the 
industry preferred methods for WLANs. The EAP-FAST is still a Cisco system variant, which 
is still a proprietary solution not widely supported. 
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                                         EAP methods 
RFC 3748 
Methods 
                        TLS based Methods 
 
Security Claims 
MD5/OTP/
GTC 
EAP-TLS EAP-TTLS PEAP EAP-FAST 
Key derivation No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Key Strength No Yes Yes Variabl
e 
Yes 
Mutual authentication  No Yes Depends Depend
s 
Yes 
Shared state 
equivalence 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dictionary attack 
resistant protection 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Man-in-the-middle 
attack 
No Yes Depends Depend
s 
Yes 
Protected ciphersuite 
negotiation   
No Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Fragmentation No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Confidentiality No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Channel binding No ? Optional Yes No 
Fast reconnect No ? Yes Yes Yes 
STA certificate None Required Optional None None 
AS certificate  None Required  Reqiured Require
d 
Optional 
Tunnel authentication 
protocols  
None None AVP EAP EAP 
Table 5: EAP methods and the security claim list. Based on information from [9, 42, 44] 
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3.3 Access control conclusion 
The IEEE 802.1X standard combined with the EAP protocol is a sufficient starting point for 
designing secure access control architectures for high assurance wireless environments. The 
EAP frameworks are divers but needs to be implemented and adapted with the organization 
security requirements. Referred to [59], it can be demonstrated that EAP-methods tunnelled 
within another protocol, such as EAP-TTLS and EAP-PEAP, can be vulnerable to Man-the-
Middle attacks. Regardless, such attacks are possible only if the authentication process is 
weak and allow a one-way association, for example that the STA authenticate the AP and not 
visa versa. In other words strong mutual authentication is a certain security requirement 
irrespective of what EAP method to implement. As mentioned in [59] other premises for a 
successful Man-in-the middle attack is the possibility for an attacker to obtain the session key 
(TK) and to compromise the Pairwise Master Key (PMK). The PMK is fundamental to 
security and must be strongly protected (referred to section 2.5.2.2 figure 12). For high 
assurance wireless networks, the recommendation [9] is to implement a hardware security 
module (HSM), for example a smartcard solution, integrated with PKI certificates, using 
EAP-TLS for authentication and cipher exchange. As shown in table 5 only EAP-TLS and 
EAP-TTLS can be used in environments requiring certificates distributed among all 
authorized entities.  To conquer the access control challenges in wireless networks, the overall 
security design must be based known security principals. From the discussion above, we can 
conclude that a secure access control solutions should preferably be implemented to follow 
strong security requirements. In the following section I will describe some important 
architectural issues and security characteristics which should be adapted for access control 
concerning high assurance wireless IEEE 802.11 implementations.     
  
3.3.1 Wireless access control requirements  
 Two-factor based authentication model at minimum. 
Access control is a very important part of high assurance wireless security systems. The 
access control solution determines an authentication model with mechanisms to keep 
unauthorized devices blocked from the wireless network. Based on this, the authentication 
model should be founded on minimum two factors of cryptographic authentication 
mechanisms. This means that the authentication model should combine mechanisms for 
“something you have”, “something you know” or “something you are” [10]. Two-factor 
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authentication principals will prevent that a single compromised password or a compromised 
STA will be able to undermine the entire security system.  
 
 Hardware security module (HSM) 
To implement a two-factor authentication model, the access control solutions should be based 
on separated security modules combined with several various authenticity components. A 
hardware security module (HSM), for example a smartcard, can be used as a physical security 
device, where authentication components such as digital certificates can be stored inside as a 
cryptographic token. A smartcard can provide authentication based on a combination of 
hardware, software, digital certificate, cryptographic key, password, pin-code or biometrics 
verification methods. The smartcard hardware-chip can be used to store, 
generate and handle security critical objects used for system device 
authenticity and confidentiality. One advantage of using a smartcard 
solution is that security critical components can be easily removed from 
the STA to prevent misuse and to separate security mechanisms from 
other STA hardware/software. An alternative solution to smartcards is the 
generic token card (GTC) as described in section 3.2.3. The combination 
of HSM, digital certificate and user ID password results in a three-factor 
authentication model. To compromise and hack into a wireless three-
factor based authentication model, attackers need to obtain a certain HSM, steal or 
compromise the associated password as well as exploiting a stored and valid digital 
certificate. This is a much more complicated scenario compared to just compromising a single 
username and password.  
Figure 27:  “eToken  PRO “ Portable USB token smartcard with PKI support 
 
 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is basically a management system which provides and 
administrates public key certificates and asymmetric cryptographic keys [6]. A software PKI-
certificate is related to “something you have”, can be used to provide authenticity, integrity 
and confidentiality. Table 6 summarizes additional PKI features. Traditional PKI is known as 
asynchronous cryptography which means that a public key is used for encryption whereas a 
private key is used for decryption. Only the owner knows the private key, whereas the public 
key is known for everyone. This also indicates that the private key can be used to provide 
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unique digitally signatures, which can be used to sign messages and transactions in order to 
ensure authenticity. PKI has several advantages compared to symmetric crypto (AES etc.), 
and obviously public key crypto does not require an established key in advance. This means 
that PKI is well suitable for wireless networks when it comes to establish secure 
communication channels. A drawback is that PKI adds substantial transaction overhead and 
depending on the PKI implementation, could result in slower and less effective link-layer 
operations.  
 
Figure 28: Example of a PKI certificate X 509 [11]  
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PKI protections Description 
 
 
Authenticates identity 
Digital certificates issued as part of your PKI 
allow individual users organizations to 
confidentiality validate the identity of each 
party in an transaction 
 
Verifies integrity 
A digital certificate ensures that the message 
or document which the certificate signs has 
not been changed or corrupted when 
transmitted 
 
Ensures privacy 
Digital certificates product protects 
information from interception during 
transmission 
 
Authorizes access 
PKI digital certificates replace easily guessed 
and frequently lost user ID’s as vulnerable 
authentication mechanisms.   
 
Authorizes transactions 
With PKI solutions your enterprise can 
control access privileges for specified 
transactions  
 
Supports nonrepudiation 
Digital certificate validate their users 
identities making it nearly impossible to later 
repudiate a digitally signed transaction 
Table 6: PKI features for access control and protection [6] 
 
 Digital certificate issues 
Deploying certificates solutions for STA’s, AP and AS represents potensial vulnerabilities 
and threats. A public key certificate (PKI) is only valid if it’s signed by a trusted 3
rd
 party 
certified authority (CA), which signifies that STA’s basically will trust an AS with any valid 
CA-certificate. As long as the AP has a correct SSID and a CA corresponding certificate, the 
STA will try to associate with the AP. This is vulnerable because an attacker can easily fake 
SSID and obtain valid certificates from certified authorities (CA), which furthermore can be 
used to set up a rough access point to capture STA’s authenticity credentials. As proposed in 
[46, 9] this can be prevented by demanding a specific RADIUS server to require the STA to 
authenticate based on a valid and adapted “server-name” certificate. This is basically because 
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it is much more difficult for attackers to imitate private certificate than a general CA 
certificate. The STA and AS should be adapted to verify several local certificate credentials, 
for example verify the certificate origin, the specific name, the correct IP sub-domain etc. 
 
 Personal identification 
Personal user secrets such as passwords or pin-codes, are related to “something you know”, 
and are ordinary identification methods used in many of today’s information systems. On the 
other side, such identification is vulnerable if access control mechanism depends on simple 
usernames and passwords exclusively. Personal user secrets are important authenticity 
elements which in combination with digital certificates provide reasonable security and trust. 
An alternative solution for personal identification is biometric systems based on for example 
fingerprints. A biometric system is even more complicated and introduces challenges 
according to robustness and error rates [10].   
 
 EAP- methods 
Referred to 3.2.3.1, EAP-TLS is designed to be implemented in PKI environments where 
certificate are stored on STA’s and AS. In addition EAP-TLS is well supported and native to 
recent windows version. Based on [9], a smartcard PKI solution based on EAP-TLS generally 
offers the greatest security. Another interesting EAP approach is a combination of PEAP and 
EAP-TLS called PEAP-EAP-TLS as described in [68].   
 
 AP communication to authentication server (AS) and distribution systems (DS) 
The IEEE 802.11i approach is only adapted for securing the wireless radio link between 
STA’s and AP. The wired communication link between the AP and the AS, and AP and 
distribution system (DS) is not a part of the RSN 802.11i specifications. This is vulnerable to 
physical availability and signifies that the access point LAN side is postponed to be 
compromised in terms of unauthorized monitoring. To prevent this, the communication 
between the AP and AS, which basically consists of RADIUS messages, should be secured 
and encapsulated using VPN IPsec techniques (network layer security) as introduced in 
section 2.6. Other suitable protection mechanisms is to use is key wrapping tools like the AES 
key-wrapping algorithm, which will be described in chapter 4, to protect key materials which 
is transmitted between the authentication server (AS) and the AP.  The communication link 
between AP and DS should also be protected, because default IP traffic will be transmitted in 
clear text. The LAN between the AP and DS must be physical secured and VPN IPsec 
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techniques can be used protect data. Another approach to protect AP to DS communication is 
to establish VPN IPsec tunnels directly from the STA’s to a VPN server located within the DS 
area. This is regardless a little more complicated scenario, which I will closer describe in 
chapter 6.        
 
 STA identification signature 
To prevent DOS and flooding attacks on the RADIUS authentication server, the AP should 
challenge the STA before sending the authentication request to the RADIUS server. Using 
public key infrastructure this can be done by requiring the STA to transmit a signed message 
to the AP. The AP verifies the message using the public key, if approved the AP forwards the 
authentication request. This will prevent unauthorized devices from challenging the AS server 
independently. The identification signature could for example be based a signed password and 
nonce, attached to the physical address.  
Example: ([“password” + “MAC-address” + nonce]SHA-1) Signed with STA private key  
 
 Mutual authentication for both STA and AP/AS 
A mutual authentication process is imperative. As discussed above both STA and AP (on 
behalf of the AS) must be authenticated.  Based on a PKI infrastructure each participating 
device must obtain a valid PKI certificate. The public key certificate must be verified by the 
STA and the AS in order to accomplish the authentication process. 
 
 STA high assurance WLAN configuration. 
Each STA’s must be forced to use a certain particular high assurance WLAN only. STA’s 
which are authorized to use a specific high assurance wireless network should not be able use 
other unclassified and insecure WLAN systems. This is because STA’s could leak 
information if a multiple of different WLAN connections are allowed. This can be 
accomplished through STA firewall rules, enforced certificate policy and a locked SSID.    
 
 Vulnerabilities to the MAC protocol 
Based on [77], RSN networks are vulnerable due to series of flaws in the 802.11 protocol. 
However, these flaws can be prevented by adding security synchronization functionality and 
authenticity to EAP messages and management frames. WLAN systems which are 
implemented with Public Key Infrastructures (PKI), can use private keys to sign link-layer 
messages to ensure transaction authenticity. On the other side such a solution would create 
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substantial overhead and probably degrade the WLAN network performance. Since only a 
minority of WLAN networks uses PKI, the IEEE 802.11w Task Group (TG) [2] is currently 
working on authenticity improvements as general approach to improve the IEEE 802.11 
protocol.    
 
 Fallback authentication strategy 
If authorized STA’s and users fail to authenticate to the WLAN system, a policy should be 
established to handle such situations. Typical reasons could by expired certificate, forgotten 
passwords, smartcard trouble or other STA problems. A fallback method should establish 
routines according to log occurrence and handle the reconditioning process. For example 
EAP-TLS alert message can be collected to investigate failures to the authentication 
processes.      
 
 Location based access control 
As described and proposed in [82], location data can be used to provide access control in 
wireless environments. The goal of location based access control is to define and determine a 
maximum allowed distance between the AP and STA. If the STA moves to far away from the 
legitimate access point (AP), the system can refuse further network negotiation. Location 
measurement mechanisms must be implemented in order to locate and position devices. 
Location based access control would potentiality prevent intruders from using high quality 
antennas to access the wireless network far away from wireless area. The challenge with 
location control is to implement an accurate location measurement system which can be used 
to locate STA’s and AP’s. For example, calculations based on the received-signal-strength 
(RSS) can be used to provide location data. Location control and location measurement will 
be closer described in chapter 5.  
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4  Confidentiality and integrity based on IEEE 802.11i 
This chapter will focus on the key management phase (key establishment), the data protection 
phase and the termination phase which was introduced inn chapter 3, figure 17. The key 
management phase is responsible for handling and generating cryptographic keys and 
cryptographic key materials which are used by cryptographic algorithms to protect the 
wireless data transmission in terms of confidentiality, integrity and authenticity (origin 
authentication). In the following chapter I will investigate and discuss the IEEE 802.11i RSN 
settlement related to AES CCMP combined with the 4-way handshake protocol to provide 
robust and secure data transmission.  
4.1 RSN confidentiality, authenticity and integrity protocols 
Basically the IEEE 802.11i standard settlement provides two types of confidentiality 
protocols; the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) and the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES). The AES algorithm is based on the Counter Mode with Cipher Block 
Chaining Message Authentication protocol (CCMP) which is identical to the algorithm used 
in VPN IPses ESP [63] networks. Because TKIP is using the RC4 algorithm which has known 
weaknesses, TKIP is not suitable for high assurance environments [2, 9]. Based on this, TKIP 
will not be discussed in this thesis as a relevant layer two confidentiality protocol. For 
environments requiring high level of security, AES CCMP is considered as a much better 
solution, and this section will take a closer look at how CCMP solves the confidentiality, 
authenticity and integrity problems in wireless 802.11 networks. For IEEE 802.11i RSN 
configurations in wireless networks, CCMP is the only approved cryptographic model. In the 
next section I will take a closer look at the CCMP functionality including encryption and 
decryption methods.    
4.1.1 CCMP 
Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining MAC Protocol (CCMP) [9, 23, 56] is a 
confidentiality protocol defined by the IEEE 802.11i standard [23]. CCMP is based on CCM 
which is a generic authenticated encryption block cipher modus based on the advanced 
encryption standard (AES) [57]. The distinct difference to the other wireless confidentiality 
protocols, such as WEP and TKIP, is that CCMP requires new hardware replacement in both 
Access Points (AP’s) and Stations (STA’s). The intention is to develop a confidentiality 
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protocol based on a secure long-term solution based on proven concepts and high security 
definitions. CCMP is therefore a mandatory component in creating wireless RSN networks. 
To provide robust network security, CCMP consists of two well known and proven 
cryptographic techniques. The first technique is counter (CRT) mode which is used for 
confidentiality and the cipher block chaining MAC (CBC-MAC) mode, which is used 
authenticity and integrity protection. The combinations of these two techniques forms block 
ciphers [10] with a 128-bits block size. To minimize complexity, CCM used in IEEE 802.11 
networks, operates with a single 128-bit session key (TK) which is used to protect the duplex 
data channel (send and receive). The key size has a range of 2
128
 possible values and is 
renewed for every new log on session. Additional, the key is used to constructs a 48-bit 
packet number (PN) nonce to protect against replay attacks. Because of the random nonce 
value, the CCM can be used for both confidentiality and integrity without compromising each 
other.   
4.1.1.1 CCM encryption process 
The CCM provides integrity for the data payload (link layer PDU datagram’s as described in 
section 2.3.1) and integrity protection for parts of the 802.11 MAC-header. For this purpose a 
single cryptographic key is used to maximize the performance. As mentioned in section 2.5.2, 
the WEP and TKIP cryptographic model is based on the RC4 algorithm which uses stream 
cipher [10] encryption methodology. Stream ciphers are optimized to be simple and efficient 
especially for radio communication networks, but due to security algorithm vulnerabilities 
there have been little effort in developing new stream ciphers. On the other side, block ciphers 
are announced as the future algorithm for the combination of secure and efficient 
cryptographic designs. Based on this, one important issues when designing the CCM block 
cipher algorithm, is to enable fast comparisons, high security and to a minimal cost of 
operations. The CCM encapsulation process is shown in figure 29. 
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Figure 29: CCM encapsulation prosedure [9] 
The CCM encryption process, which is referred to as the CCMP encapsulation procedure in 
figure 29, is the process of generating a cryptographic payload from the plain text data. As 
introduced in chapter 2, the plain text data includes layer two data (PDU datagram’s) and a 
MAC header. The plaintext data and parts of the MAC-header are combined with the CCM 
encryption algorithm to derive a cipher-text MPDU datagram. The CCM algorithm has the 
following input values [9]: 
 
 Frame body data (variable plain text) and MAC-header 
 Temporal cryptographic Key (TK) 128-bit (Session Key) 
 Packet number (PK) and a nonce (48-bit) 
 Additional Authentication Data (AAD) 
 
From figure 29 we observe that the 48-bits packet number (PN) is incremented, and in 
combination with the transmitter address (A2), constructs a unique nonce value. The 
incremented packet number and the KeyID, which is a temporal key identification, are used to 
generate the CCM header. The additional authentication data (ADD) is a 22 byte or 28 byte 
parameter which comprises several fields, like the MAC-address fields and the quality of 
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service field, to provide integrity and authenticity to the data packet. The ADD, the nonce 
value, the 128-bit temporal key (TK) and the plain text data creates a fixed encrypted CCM 
data output. A message integrity code (MIC) is added at the end of the MPDU for frame 
integrity protection. As shown in figure 29 the final encrypted datagram contains four fields; a 
MAC field, a CCM field, an encrypted data field and a MIC field. 
 
4.1.1.2  CCM decryption process 
The decapsulation process, which is used to recover the encrypted datagram, is shown in 
figure 30.  This process is very similar to encapsulation procedure, except from the deriving 
sequence, and that you need to possess necessary key materials to be able to accomplish the 
decryption proceedings.  To be precise, the recipient needs the correct temporal session key 
(TK) and the nonce value to able to recover the MPDU datagram into plain text data.                    
 
Figure 30: CCM decapsulation prosedure [9] 
The first thing that occurs when the MPDU datagram is received by the STA or the AP is to 
analyze the MAC and the CCM header to reconstruct the ADD and the nonce value. The 
nonce value is formed based on the received packet number (PN), the transmitter address A2 
and the priority fields. The purpose of PN value is to protect against relay attacks, and if the 
received PN value is not a greater than the session PN or part of the maintained session PN 
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the frame will be discarded automatically. Furthermore, as shown in figure 25, the CCM 
algorithm uses the additional authentication data (ADD), the nonce value, the en encrypted 
frame, the MIC and the temporal key to recover the plain text data. The MIC is used for an 
integrity check and if the MIC fails, the CCM will not continue the decryption process and the 
frame will be discarded.      
4.2 CCMP, key establishment and management 
To establish a secure CCMP communication link in terms of a Robust Security Network 
Association (RSNA), the STA and the Access point must exchange secrets which are 
necessary to derive keys from the pair-ways master key (PMK). To do this the wireless high 
assurance system must organize its keys hierarchy through key management and key handling 
processes. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) defines key management [3] as “the 
process of handling and controlling cryptographic keys and related material  (such as 
initialization values) during their life cycle within a cryptographic system, including ordering, 
generating, distributing, storing, loading, escrowing, archiving, auditing, and destroying the 
material.” In other words, key-generation, key-distribution, key-handling, key-storing and 
key-destruction are important key factors in wireless high assurance networks. If the key 
generation, distribution or storing process renders the possibility to compromise cryptographic 
keys it would devastate the overall wireless security system. Based on this key management 
should conduct the following requirements [9]:  
 
 Keys needs to be randomly generated to reduce the probability that they can be 
determined 
 The key in use needs to frequently changed to reduce the possibility of successful 
cryptoanalysis 
 The keys need to be protected while in storage 
 The keys need to protected during transmission 
 The keys need to be completely erased after use, without leaving any tracks.   
 
As described in section 2.5.2.2, the IEEE 802.11i standard defines the Pairwise Key 
Hierarchy (PMK) for unicast communication, and Group Key Hierarchy (GMK) for 
multicast/broadcast communication protection. Both hierarchies rely on a root-key which is 
either pre-shared (PSK) or distributed (AAAK). The root-key is formulated and associated as 
a key-generation-key used to derivate Pairwise Transient Keys (PTK). 
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4.2.1 The 4 way-handshake 
After a successful authentication process as described in chapter 3, the AP and the STA has to 
agree on what encryption key to use. Referred to chapter 3 figure 15 the subsequent phase 3, 
the key management phase, is vital to establish a secure AES CCMP encrypted 
communication channel. To be able to securely exchange essential key materials, both AP and 
STA has to perform series of functions resulting in a secure handshake procedure positioning 
cryptographic keys in both entities. Referred to [9] this procedure is called the key generation 
and distribution (KGD) phase. In RSN 802.11 networks the KGD phase also provides the 
finale step in authentication and makes sure that both AP and STA has correct keys to 
establish a secure wireless communication channel. One of the objectives behind the KGD 
phase is to confirm several important derivation issues. For example the KGD phase confirms 
that there exist a PMK, that secure association keys are new and that the cipher suite selection 
is correct. I addition, the KGD derives and synchronizes the installation process of temporal 
traffic encryption keys for AP and STA’s and distribute group keys for multicast/broadcast 
traffic protection. To perform the KGD there exist two different procedures, the 4-way 
Handshake and the group Handshake. Both these handshakes provide the ability to securely 
exchange key materials, but the group-handshake is only used when STA participates in 
multicast or broadcast traffic. Both handshakes procedures provide the following fundamental 
security features [9]: 
 
 Message integrity check to prevent message tampering and source validation 
 Message encryption to protect against eavesdropping and message disclosure  
 
To provide both confidentiality and integrity for the handshake process there currently exists 
to supported algorithms; The RC4 encryption with HMAC-MD5 or the AES key Wrap with 
HMAC_SHA-1-128. Base on the RC4 vulnerabilities, the RSN 802.11 configurations 
recommends the AES Key Wrap algorithm [58]. The AES Key Wrap algorithm is specially 
designed to encrypt cryptographic keys. The algorithm use AES codebook mode along with 
EAPOL-KCK (section 2.5.2.2) derived from the PTK and forms key-blocks of 64 bits to be 
encrypted (“wrapped”). The 4-way handshake is shown in figure 31, and shows a frame 
exchange procedure where STA and AP perform several computations and generations 
resulting in cryptographic keys and a secondary mutual authentication process.    
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Figure 31:  4-Way Handshake procedure 
After a successful 4-way handshake, the IEEE 802.11 controlled port is open and allows the 
STA to send and receive data from the wireless network. As described in figure 26, frame 2, 3 
and 4 are protected with a MIC which is computed over the entire EAPOL-frame, and 
protects messages against modifications. Although frame 1 is not MIC integrity protected 
because the STA needs the AP nonce value to be able to derive the EAPOL-KCK (se section 
2.5.2.2) which is used to compute the MIC for EAPOL key packets. Modifications to frame 1 
are still possible to detect using other checking mechanisms [9]. As mention in section 2.5.2.2 
the STA during the 4-way handshake also drives the EAPOL-KEK which is used to ensure 
confidentiality to EAPOL-Key packets and the temporal key (TK) which is used to encrypt 
wireless data traffic.    
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4.2.2 Secure connection termination    
As shown in chapter 3 figure 17, the last phase in the RSNA process is the termination phase. 
In this phase the STA and the AP terminates the connections, deletes the association and 
restore the connection to the initialized state. This termination phase is important because all 
association tracks, encryption keys and temporal keys must be deleted. In addition the IEEE 
802.11 controlled port is locked immediately after disassociation.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Agder University College Faculty of Engineering and Science 
  79 
4.3 Confidentiality, authenticity and integrity conclusion 
The CCMP confidentiality protocol is a well founded and approved security protocol which 
according to [9] can be recommended as a standard encryption algorithm for high assurance 
wireless networks. As long as the input values are kept secret and randomized, crypto 
analysing processes and brute force attacks are considered extremely difficult. Based on this, 
security relies on the capability to safely exchange key derivation materials. The IEEE 
802.11i RSN networks introduce the 4-way handshake protocol for this purpose. As described 
in section 4.2.1 the handshake protocol can be used to authenticate as well as to exchange key 
credentials. Even if the PMK is generated from a pre-shared key (PSK) or from the EAP 
handshake process described in chapter 3, the 4-way handshake protocol must execute in 
order to confirm fresh crypto keys, cipher suites and to verify the STA authenticity. 
Additionally the authenticator (AP) and the STA can use the 4-Way handshake protocol to 
refresh the PTK key periodically. This indicates that based on the AP and STA configuration, 
the CCMP session key (TK) can be refreshed several times during a session using the 4 way-
handshake protocols, but for one instance of the protocol, only one fresh PTK value is valid. 
In case of packet loss or delay, which is general in wireless networks, the 4-way handshake 
protocol must be able to handle multiple protocol instances in parallel. For example if frame-
two (shown in figure 31) is lost, the instance of frame-one will be discarded by the STA. 
Therefore the STA has to allow any instance of frame-one and accordingly, referred to [60], 
the 4-Way Handshake protocol is vulnerable to frame-one flooding attacks. This means that 
attackers can initialize new instances of the handshake protocol to block valid frame-one 
messages. As described in [60] and [64] the handshake problem can be solved by adding a 
different MIC code to the frame-one message. Since the problem with the frame-one is that 
the STA does not have the nonce value, the PMK combined with a sequence counter can be 
used to assure message-one authenticity and integrity. If the WLAN access control system is 
based on PKI certificates, another approach to solve this problem is using the private key to 
sign frame-one messages. As a general approximation PKI can be used to sign any frames 
within the 802.11 protocol but such an implementation would be extensive and probably 
affect network performance. Another problem, as shown in section 2.5.4 figure 14, is that 
IEEE 802.11i does not protect management frames and control frame. This is vulnerable, and 
the IEEE 802.11w project is working on these problem issues. If the high assurance WLAN 
solution implements PKI, private keys can be used to provide authenticity and thereby avoid 
several attacks, such as DOS and flooding attacks, related to management and control frames.   
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Security Protocol Security functionality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IEEE 802.1X 
Defines a layer two framework for access 
control based on the Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP) where EAP 
messages are used to exchange 
authentication data, execute authentication 
sequences and derivate cryptographic keys. 
The framework introduces an Authentication 
Server (AS), such as a RADIUS server, and 
uses port based access control 
(controlled/uncontrolled port) to restrict 
access to the distribution systems (DS). The 
EAP Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) 
protocol is a well supported and quality 
assured protocol, which is particularly 
adapted for WLAN public key infrastructures 
(PKI).    
 
 
 
 
 
IEEE 802.11i 
IEEE 802.11i is a layer two specific security 
protocol, where IEEE 802.1X provides the 
authentication framework within an IEEE 
802.11i settlement. IEEE 802.11i, also 
known as the WPA2 standard, introduces 
specifications on encryption, authenticity, 
integrity and approaches to key management. 
IEEE 802.11i defines the 4-way handshake 
which is used to establish, confirm and 
authenticate key materials. I addition AES- 
CCMP is implemented to protect 
transmission of wireless data traffic. IEEE 
802.1X based authentication and IEEE 
802.11i AES-CCMP, establishes Robust 
Security Networks (RSN’s).     
Table 7: Summary and overview of IEEE 802.1X and IEEE 802.11i 
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4.3.1 Further work 
We may conclude that security protocols such as IEEE 802.1X combined with IEEE 802.11i 
is a good starting point for building secure wireless solutions. In addition, if access control 
and authentication mechanisms are based on PKI implementations, it is possible to manage a 
wide range of threats concerning wireless networks. But, even if we implement such solution 
we do not have any control over which device that operates within the wireless area or 
receiving signals from the network. As a compromise to physical security, we need to 
implement functionality to observer, control and guard the wireless channels and the network 
to supervise availability. This brings along the problem that IEEE 802.1X and IEEE 802.11i 
does not have the ability to protect the wireless network and prevent devices against attackers 
and intruders which tries to infiltrate the wireless environment. We need mechanisms which 
are capable to detect unauthorized devices that try to associate with network and device which 
initiates attack against the WLAN infrastructure. I addition we need mechanisms which are 
capable to automatically handle the threats, protect the environment and locate devices which 
operates denunciatory. In the next section I will introduce a system that potentially may meet 
availability aspects by inserting mechanisms for monitoring, control, detection and protection 
of high assurance wireless environments.            
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5  Availability – control, detection and protection 
In order to safeguard the wireless network it is required to add security mechanisms to protect 
the wireless environment against threats and malicious activities. Intrusion detection system 
(IDS) [72] for wired LAN networks have been known for many years and introduces sets of 
security tools with capabilities to supervise and protect computer networks. The idea behind 
IDS systems can be transferred into wireless networks in order to observe, control and detect 
unwanted and spurious wireless traffic. To implement a wireless detection system, wireless 
sensor devices must be distributed to monitor data channels and frames in order to analyze 
traffic, detect abnormalities and protect the wireless network environment. Over the last years 
vendors and research companies [16, 27, 32, 33, 34] have been working on developing 
solutions for wireless detection and protection systems based on using IEEE 802.11 access 
points put in monitor mode, set to observe the wireless network. Some solutions have monitor 
functionality implemented into corporate access points (AP’s), others suggest external and 
independent distributed monitors (sensor AP’s) for wireless system monitoring and 
supervision. In the following chapter the thesis will investigate wireless intrusion detection 
and protection mechanisms and discuss how wireless monitor devices (access points put in 
monitor mode) can be used for perimeter control and to identify wireless threats and 
vulnerabilities. In terms of protecting the wireless environment and its legitimate devices, the 
thesis will discuss and propose ways to design a monitor defence system including 
capabilities to respond to active attacks. Since no architecture for wireless protection systems 
has been provided, the monitor system architecture presented in this thesis will be based on 
ideas concerning the following papers [73, 74, 75], which renders the possibility to develop a 
Monitor Defence System (MDS) as a principle design.        
5.1 Availability aspects 
To address availability aspect of wireless networks, access control, confidentiality, integrity 
and authenticity are important security prospects in order to oblige WLAN threats and 
vulnerabilities. Even though, to comply with physical security and to handle availability 
challenges, research [73, 74, 75] has introduced ideas of using wireless sensor devices to 
observe the wireless network environment in order to control the enterprise, its operations and 
the security settlement. To do this, passive WLAN monitors must be distributed to “watch the 
waves”, giving administrators the ability to foresee and detect security breaches and threat 
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occurrence. This requires a trusted 3
rd
 party security system to be implemented capable to 
address WiFi availability aspects which can not be handled by implementing protocols such 
as IEEE 802.1X and IEEE 802.11i. Wireless monitor systems with intrusion-detection-and-
protection capabilities are still in the early evolution process, but the fundamental idea behind 
such implementations has security promising opportunities. This section will describe and 
discuss wireless monitor system used for intrusion detection in wireless environments and 
how wireless active protection system can be used to guard the wireless network.       
5.1.1 Observing the wireless network and the environment 
Observing the wireless network can be performed by corporate access points (AP’s) or using 
external wireless access points (AP’s) put in monitor mode (sensor devices). As mentioned in 
[74], a single AP can not effectively monitor the WLAN network environment without 
adversely impacting associated clients and degrade network performance. The main task of 
traditional AP’s is to operate as a link-layer-forwarder (wireless link-layer bridge) and 
exchange data packets between the wireless network and the corporate wired network (DS). If 
the AP is configured to monitor the WiFi channels for intrusion detection, it will potentially 
degrade network performance. Passive sensor devices (monitor AP’s) that are dedicated as 
observation posts and set to report what it can “hear”, will not interfere with operational 
wireless system. On the other side, using wireless sensors in encrypted wireless environments 
signifies that only the physical-layer (OSI-layer-1) and link-layer (OSI-layer 2) headers can 
be supervised. As shown in figure 32, the access point can also operate as an active protection 
device (red). Active protection devices will be closer described later in this chapter in section 
5.2.  
 
Figure 32: Shows three access points used in different scenarios 
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5.1.1.1 Types of wireless sensor and detection systems  
As a general approach, there are four potential ways to observe the wireless network. The first 
two ways are either using the existing wireless infrastructure (corporate AP’s) or using 
independent wireless distributed sensor devices (monitor AP’s) to observe data traffic. The 
third way to observe wireless communication aspects is host based sensor systems 
implemented into STA’s and a fourth possibility is to use wired sensor systems implemented 
on the LAN side. Often a combination of such sensors is required to fully analyse the network 
communication spectrum. The wireless sensor system scenario is shown in figure 33. Because 
different sensors have various capabilities, a wireless monitor solution should be deployed as 
a welled combination of wireless distributed sensors, host-sensors and wired LAN sensors 
which together provide data collection and abnormal detection functionality. This thesis will 
mainly focus on wireless distributed sensor devices and capabilities.  
 
Figure 33: Types of sensors in wireless network 
 
1. Wireless sensors using corporate access points (AP’s) 
A wireless sensor system may be implemented into AP’s using the existing wireless 
infrastructure network to collect data. Besides forwarding link-layer network traffic, the AP 
has to scan channels and report events to a detection server. The advantage of using the AP to 
monitor the wireless network is to possibility to supervise clear text frames including data and 
headers. The drawback is that the AP will operate less effective and for a WLAN system 
which handles a large number of users, it will potentially affect and degrade the wireless 
network performance. The thesis will not consider AP as a topical sensor device.    
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2. Distributed wireless sensors devices 
Distributed wireless sensors are based external IEEE 802.11 access points, which are put into 
monitoring mode to observe the wireless network traffic. These devices act as sensor probes 
collecting frames and forwarding them to a detection system which examines the frames and 
the headers. This requires the sensors to be distributed within wireless network area to cover 
the scope and the channel accessibility. A drawback is that distributed wireless sensors cannot 
analyse encrypted frames and thereby not capable to examine data from higher layers.  On the 
other side, wireless sensors can observe the physical-layer and link-layer headers which 
render the possibility to detect a wide range of wireless threats and vulnerabilities. This is 
because the wireless association process basically consists of OSI-layer 1 and OSI-layer 2 
communication prospectives, shown in figure 34. In section 5.1.3 and 5.1.4 wireless sensor 
capabilities, advantages and disadvantages will be discussed.   
 
Figure 34: Wireless sensor observation aspects 
 
 
3. Wired LAN sensors 
A wired LAN sensor, which is used by traditional intrusion detection systems (IDS), is 
typically implemented on the LAN side behind the access point (AP) and plays an important 
part of a wireless monitoring solution. A wired LAN sensor system is shown in figure 35. The 
wired-sensors referred to as “Land-Monitors” in [74], can be used to analyse clear text LAN 
packets as well as clear text frames and can examine data from the higher OSI-model layers. 
The wired sensor can observe LAN traffic and collect data frames floating between the AP 
and the distribution system (DS) as well as between the AP and the authentication server 
(AS).  
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Figure 35: Wired LAN sensors Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
 
 
4. Host sensors implemented into STA’s 
Host sensor system, known as host based intrusion detection systems (IDS), is implemented 
into each authorized STA’s which uses the high assurance wireless network. A host based 
IDS is capable to detect several potential vulnerabilities directed towards STA’s both 
covering OSI-layer one and two, as well as higher OSI-layers. The host-sensor IDS system 
can block the STA wireless access if severe threat occurs, and report threat events to the 
wireless monitor system. The advantage is that a host IDS can examine clear text data, but the 
drawback is that with heavy load of data the IDS will potentially degrade STA 
communication performance. Due to the time limit, this thesis will not be able to focus on 
STA sensor IDS system. 
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5.1.2 A wireless distributed monitor architecture  
A wireless monitor system typically consists of several components which interconnects and 
solves different tasks in order to supervise and control the wireless environment. Figure 36 
show a principle design model how of wireless monitor system architecture could look like.  
 
Figure 36: Principle architecture of a wireless monitoring system 
As figure 36 shows, the wireless sensor devices (yellow) perform monitoring as stand alone 
hardware sensors distributed within the wireless environment. These devices report RF-
channel data frames to a wireless monitor-collector. The monitor collector is responsible to 
organize the wireless data channels and synchronize the data to be delivered to the intrusion 
detection system (IDS). The intrusion detection system analysis and examines the data stream 
based on rules defined by the administrator system. The sensor-devices operates passively, 
which means that they can not be wirelessly detected, connected to or associated with using 
other wireless LAN equipment. The wireless sensor listens to IEEE 802.11 traffic frames, by 
scanning available channels within the wireless network area. As shown in table 2 chapter 2, 
the ISM band (2.4 Ghz) consists of 11 channels, and to cover channel range, the sensor-
devices must listen to different channels in time. This signifies that incoming frames on 
particular channels may be lost. To prevent this, more sensor devices must be distributed to 
cover the different channels more effectively. The active response system is meant to act and 
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respond to different threats and attacks detected by the IDS system. The active respond 
systems system will be closer described section 5.2. A wireless monitor system and 
components are shown in figure 37.  
 
Figure 37: Wireless monitor system implementation  
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5.1.3 Wireless monitor system advantages and capabilities 
As earlier discussion indicates, wireless monitoring system has many potential options that 
can be used to address several security challenges related to wireless network.  The capability 
list is entirely interesting and research is still progressing to meet new types of threats and 
vulnerabilities. In following section I will present some of the main security tasks and 
principle application areas which such systems are capable to address.  
 
 Detection of SSID, channels and security configuration   
Even if an AP broadcasts SSID or not, STA and AP beacons signals can be easily identified 
by monitoring the wireless network environment. Based on this, mechanisms can be used to 
filter out different networks and their security configuration and requirements. Network 
Stumbler (NetStumbler) [76] is an example of a free software tool that monitors and captures 
information about nearby WLAN networks. Monitoring channels, SSID’s and security 
parameters can be used for protection objectives as well as for potential intruders that seeks 
wireless network information. Figure 38 shows how NetStumbler easily captures information 
on different access points related to SSID, channels, MAC addresses, security configurations, 
signal level, noise level, data rates, protocols etc.  
 
Figure 38: NetStumbler overview 
 
 Physical layer and data link layer frame analysis 
As indicated in figure 38, the physical layer frame header can be used to examine signal 
strength, noise levels and data rates in order to detect disturbances/interference and areas of 
poor wireless coverage. This is an important tool in planning a WLAN settlement and to find 
appropriate locations for AP’s.  The data link layer, including the MAC frame as described in 
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section 2.3.1, can be used to verify information, such as valid MAC addresses (physical 
addresses), frame types (data, control or management frame), protocol types, different types 
of nodes, encrypted networks etc. Another example is that monitoring system can observe the 
RSNI field, as show in figure 19 in chapter 3.1, which makes it possible to outline number of 
unauthorized devices which do not meet the security requirements. Figure 39 shows an 
example of a wireless network-analyser tool called AiroPeek[85], which shows how OSI-
layer one and OSI-layer two information aspects can be easily observed through monitoring.  
 
Figure 39: AiroPeek NX, a wireless LAN network analyser tool from Wildpackets.  
 
 Identifying STA/AP request/responses exchange 
As shown in figure 39, a wireless monitoring system can be used to examine the messages 
flow between STA’s and AP’s in order to detect abnormal behaviour. This is a valuable 
property especially to supervise identification, authentication and association processes as 
discussed in chapter 3 and 4. For example the monitor system can detect increased numbers of 
disassociation messages which could indicate a flooding attack. The wireless monitor system 
has to interact with the access control server (RADIUS) to effectively verify and detect 
undesirable changes to the message flow. The RADIUS server possesses information on 
public keys used in the wireless network, and the public key can be used by the monitor 
system to verify different STA‘s authenticity. This signifies that the wireless monitor systems 
must be interconnected and integrated with the high assurance wireless system to be able to 
make the most out of its potential. 
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 Mapping devices which operates within the wireless environment 
As shown in figure 40, AiroPeek which is a wireless LAN analyzer tool, indicates that a 
monitoring system can be used to map devices which operate and communicate within the 
nearby wireless environment. Such a map can be used by a monitor system to detect wireless 
devices, which based on the physical address (MAC-address), do not belong to the corporate 
high assurance wireless network. The monitor system can use such information to follow 
unauthorized devices activity and detect the devices that experiments with high assurance 
network. Notice that such analyzer is dependant on that device acquires information and 
probes the air for available access points. It can not detect passive devices which operate 
within the wireless network area.  
 
Figure 40: AiroPeek shows communication mapping based on the wireless observed MAC-addresses 
     
 Wireless rogue device detection 
Typical threats to WLAN’s systems are unauthorized devices such as rogue clients or access 
point’s that acquires access to wireless network credentials or resources. A rogue AP device 
can be physically placed inside your network area (controlled area) either connected or not 
connected to the local infrastructure (LAN). These rough devices can be brought in by 
employees, visitors or attackers that gains physical access to the network area. Alternatively, 
rogue AP’s can be placed as neighbouring network outside the network area but still 
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reachable for STA’s and AP’s within the controlled area. If a legitimate STA connects to a 
rogue AP, or a rogue AP manages to associate with the local distribution system (LAN), it can 
potentially reveal all WLAN security. Distributed monitor systems can be used to detect new 
devices that occur within WLAN range. As described in [74] this can be done implementing 
filters that summarizes the SSID (AP network name) and the belonging MAC addresses 
(physical address), and at regular intervals transmit this information to a detection server. This 
functionality might be vulnerable because attackers can use phishing techniques to fake both 
SSID and the MAC address. The rogue devices detection mechanisms should include a 
counter that systematize the number of AP’s and verifies broadcast messages to verify public 
keying signatures. This signifies that the monitoring system must know the public keys 
deployed in the wireless network and, as all ready mentioned, cooperate with the access 
control server (RADIUS). In addition the wireless monitor systems must confirm if rogue 
AP’s are physical connected to corporate LAN or not. This can be accomplished by checking 
if the rogue device is reachable from the LAN side. Based on this verification the detection 
server can decide what action to perform to prevent to rogue devices to obtain network critical 
information.   
 
 Location providers 
A distributed sensor system can be used to locate devices (STA’s) operating within the 
WLAN network area by measuring the received signal strength from wireless devices. For 
accurate location estimation, multiple sensors should work together and exchange 
measurement data. The wireless sensor system can be used to collect data that can be used 
draw maps and position STA’s and AP’s current location. Location services can be used for 
defence control, access control and for attacking objectives. The thesis will discuss location 
services in section 5.2.4. 
 
 Detection of Denial Of Service (DOS) attacks 
Several flaws in the IEEE 802.11 network architecture [78, 77] can be used to perform variety 
of DOS attacks to wireless networks. Attackers exploiting flaws in 802.11 protocols may 
potentially disable the wireless link and disrupt communication. For example primitive radio 
equipment can be used to broadcast noise which interferes with the WLAN 2,4 GHz 
frequencies area, or invalid frame can be broadcasted to AP’s and STA’s in order to interrupt 
the wireless communication. A described in [77], large number of association/disassociation 
request or EAP-authentication failure messages can be transmitted in order to turn down AP’s 
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and STA’s. Apparently, the detection system may easily detect such abnormal behaviour, and 
the AP can automatically block the attacker MAC address to prevent further actions. On the 
other side an attacker may use random MAC address spoofing to perform the attack, which 
complicates the protection process. To handle such scenarios active respond mechanisms are 
required to either lure the attacking devices to a “wireless honeypot network” or as described 
in [78] transmit malformed frames directed specifically at the intruder to crash the attacker 
system. Using the monitor system to locate the attacking devices makes it possible physically 
to find and remove the enemy device. Active responds systems are closer described in section 
5.2.   
 
 Supervise flaws of the MAC protocol 
Because of the flaws in the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol described in [77], a wireless 
monitoring system renders the possibility to observer the MAC protocol and report if changed 
behaviour occurs. Referred to [73], this is crucial for effective diagnostic of wireless LAN’s. 
The monitor system can observe frames and detect changes based on known flaws of the 
802.11 protocol, for example disassociation frames or unsecured management and control 
frames.  
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5.1.4 Wireless monitor systems drawbacks and infirmities  
The following will describe some challenges and weaknesses considering a wireless 
monitoring systems deployment. 
 
 Monitoring in wireless encrypted data network 
A wireless monitoring system which is implemented as part of an encrypted OSI-layer 2 RSN 
environment lacks the ability to examine data frames. This means that the intrusion detection 
server, as shown in figure 36 and 37, can not examine other information aspects than physical 
layer headers and the link layer headers. To be able to examine higher layers of the OSI 
model, a wired LAN IDS system [72] must be implemented on the LAN network to capture 
and analyse clear text data frames. A wired LAN IDS system, as showed in figure 35, can 
control data in order to supervise and detect suspicious network traffic coming from the 
higher OSI-layers.    
 
 High costs and heavy implementations 
A wireless monitoring system may constitute a complicated implementation, involving a large 
number of sensors, over-complex system architecture and high costs. The DAIR [74] project 
introduces ides of using wireless USB devices based on IEEE 802.11 technology to be 
distributed among stationary machines and laptops using the enterprise network infrastructure 
to probe the wireless network. This is an interesting approach to large enterprise wireless 
solutions which requires wireless detection and protection systems. For example it possible to 
equip each authorized STA with two wireless network cards, where one of the cards is used to 
operate towards the corporate WLAN network, whereas the other network card is used the 
monitor wireless activity.  
  
 Limited capacity of each sensor and capturing capability 
Each sensor devices used in a wireless monitoring system may either scan a subset of the 
available channels or constantly monitor a predefined channel. If a sensor is set to scan 
channels it is possible to miss important frames and network message when hopping to other 
channels. If the sensor stays on dedicated channel it will capture all particular channel 
information, but it will miss information on other frequency-channels. To solve this more 
sensors must be distributed and interconnected to effectively cover a more appropriate 
channels subset. This is also a question of complexity, probability and the consequences of 
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loosing some frames. Based on [77], a single wireless sensor and its capturing capability are 
limited in terms of measurement loss (packets loss) and the hearing (receiving) range. 
Additionally the sensor can only collect data from one channel at the time, and the receiving 
capability is depending on sensor hardware, antenna propagation and the signal strength.  
  
 False positives detections  
The system relays on the intrusion detection server to analyse data in order to detect 
suspicious activity. This might result in false alarms when legitimate devices fail to 
authenticated to the WLAN system. IDS rules and statistics must be implemented in order to 
separate normal activity from abnormal behaviour and to segregate intruders from authorized 
devices. This means that a wireless monitor system must learn and tune its detection 
capabilities. For example, the monitor system could make statistics on particular flawed 
frames, such as deauthentication frames, and observer and estimate changes compared to 
normal activity. This would make it possible to detect potential flooding attacks and DOS 
attacks which utilize weaknesses of the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol [77].   
 
 Eavesdropping and passive attacks 
Eavesdropping as explained in section 2.4.2.1, are based on attackers and outsiders that 
passively listens to the wireless data traffic, and secondly uses code breaking techniques to 
compromise data packets. As concluded in [74] such attacks are extremely difficult to handle, 
if not impossible to detect by a monitoring system and therefore the wireless security system 
must relay on the implemented confidentiality mechanisms. On the other side [78] suggest to 
meet such threats by inserting a legitimate “Fake-AP” network and a “wireless honeypot” 
which indents to confuse and lure eavesdroppers/attackers to listen to and potentially 
associate with a fake wireless system. Wireless honeypot system is a fundamental idea 
according to insert protection functionality in wireless networks, and the thesis will 
investigate this idea in section 5.2.     
   
 Data collection scalability 
In an enterprise high security wireless network environment, a large amount of monitoring 
data will be collected, which means that the monitoring system must handle heavy loads of 
information. A centralized detection server solution may be become a bottleneck. To increase 
scalability aspects the wireless sensor device can be composed with intelligence, which in 
distributed manner can solve detection and protection task more efficiently.  
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5.2 Monitor system and active responses 
An ideal intrusion detection system (IDS) should actively respond to threats. Wireless monitor 
system which uses passive components (passive sensor AP’s), creates challenges according to 
perform active protection to prevent none-legitimate devices and intruders from fumbling 
with the corporate WLAN system. A wireless monitor protection system requires active 
devises which based on threat-occurrences may correspond and communicate with potential 
intruders in order to defend the wireless network. As discussed section 5.1.3, unauthorized 
devices which attempts to connect to corporate WLAN can be easily detected by the 
monitoring system. To respond to such incidents active sensor devices (AP’s), which in this 
section will be referred to as “Fake AP response devices”, must be implemented by the 
monitor system to be able to warn intruders and inspect the potential threat. 
5.2.1 A monitor protection system and architectural issues 
Working on active protection functionality in a wireless environment is difficult and very 
challenging area. Monitoring system can easily detect a wide range of attacks against a 
wireless infrastructure, but how can we implement mechanisms which can automatically 
handle threats and attacks? As shown in figure 41, the wireless monitor system has been 
expanded with an Active Response System (ARS) marked in red. The ARS consists of several 
IEEE 802.11 “Fake access points” acting as response devices connected to a response system 
which prepares a “Fake AP honeypot network” (red). Referred to figure 37, the Active 
Response System (ARS) is part of a wireless monitor system solution, where active devices 
are used cover protection aspects which the passive devices can not handle. The purpose of 
using active devices is the opportunity to correspond with potential intruders and to collected 
information about impending devices. Active devices, which is basically a normally access 
point, have the ability to actively respond to threats. As shown in figure 41, the “Fake AP” 
honeypot network is interconnected with the active device and establishes a “Fake AP” 
environment which from an attacker point of view tends to look like the corporate high 
assurance WLAN network. The active respond system is responsible to coordinate the active 
protection process which involves interconnection and cooperation with the passive monitor 
system and the corporate WLAN environment. As shown in figure 41, a location server has 
been added as physical component responsible for location services. Location services [81, 
82, 83] can be achieved by using several passive and active IEEE 802.11 devices to measures 
signal strength and propagation to map and determine location control and distance to 
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wireless devices which operates within the wireless environment. Location services will be 
closer described in section 5.2.4. 
 
Figure 41: A wireless monitor and protection system principle design  
 
As general approach, the wireless monitor protection system is capable to oblige several 
threats to WLAN’s, and in the next section I will take a closer look at honeypot system, and 
how active devices are capable to protect the network. The following section 5.2.2 to 5.2.5 
will discuss four important opportunities and challenges by implementing an active protection 
system. These challenges are; WLAN honeypot network (Fake AP), correspondence with 
none-legitimate devices, location service and active responses to threats. 
5.2.2 Fake AP and WLAN honeypot network 
To protect the WLAN environment and to confuse potential intruders the Active Response 
System (ARS) introduces decoys. A honeypot system [75, 80] is a fake computer system 
which is set up to trap attackers. In a wireless context fake access-point-networks can be 
established to lure attackers to connect to a falsified wireless network. The idea behind such 
network is to obtain information on potential intruders as well as to prevent none-legitimate 
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devices from accessing and attacking the corporate WLAN network. The “Fake AP” honeypot 
system must perfectly simulate the corporate AP including configuration and security settings. 
To achieve this, the corporate AP must cooperate with the fake honeypot AP. In addition the 
active response system must cooperate with the RADIUS server. Only the RAIDUS server 
and the active response system know which access point is corporate and which is fake. This 
scenario is shown in figure 42. 
 
Figure 42: Wireless honeypot must cooperate with the legitimate WLAN. 
The fake AP, which is controlled by the active response system (ARS), provides access to a 
honeypot wireless solution. The active response system (ARS) can then be used to capture 
information on the intruder device (STA) such as to check software, operation system, 
configurations and protocol types, security settings, port scanning, firewall etc. This data can 
be used to profile potential intruders and warn non-legitimate devices which experiments with 
the wireless network. The scenario has many potential challenges according to how such 
system, as shown in figure 42, should “corporate” to separate legitimate STA’s from intruder 
devices. If the wireless network is based on PKI, the corporate AP could use authenticity 
through correct signed requests (private key signature) and message verification to determined 
if the device is legitimate or not. If the device, as the intruder shown in figure 42, has an 
incorrect authenticity, the corporate AP could request the fake AP to connect with the devices. 
This is also shown in figure 43. The request can be forwarded by the RADIUS server to the 
active response system to initiate a connection with potential intruder device. The intruder 
devices will then associate with the fake AP honeypot system. The honeypot system may 
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inform and warn the intruder devices about that it is trying to associate with wireless network 
which it is not authorized to use. A potential problem with this scenario may arise due to 
transmission bit-errors and interference, which may result in that legitimate devices 
associating with the network ends up in the fake AP honeypot solution. The WLAN honeypot 
solutions is still only a theoretically approach to how an active response system can be used to 
implemented automatic protection in high assurance WLAN systems. The idea needs to be 
closer evolved before it can be implemented, tested and verified as a protection solution for 
high assurance wireless networks.     
5.2.3 Correspondence with none-legitimate devices 
Another important challenge is how the fake AP honeypot solution will correspond with 
none-legitimate devices and how such systems would perfectly separate authorized STA’s 
from unauthorized devices. “Wardriving” software [75], such as NetStumbler [76] and other 
wireless network tools can be used to acquire information about neighbourhood wireless 
network. These network tools request information, such as SSID, protocol types, 
configuration and security settings from nearby available Access Points (AP’s) as shown in 
figure 38. Such network tools leave behind their connected hardware address (MAC address) 
and a monitor system will automatically detect addresses as a none-legitimate device. As 
described in [75], the monitor system can use the active devices, such as the fake AP 
honeypot, to fingerprint possible intruders to determined information such as software 
configuration, protocols configuration and operation system. This information can be used to 
profile the intruder for known vulnerabilities.  
 
Figure 43: Intruder (fake MAC-address) ends up in the honey pot because of lacking authenticity.   
If the intruder launches an attack against the WLAN network, the monitor system can defend 
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the network more efficiently by exploiting the vulnerabilities and lure the attacker based on its 
own weaknesses. As shown in figure 43, the intruder uses a fake MAC address [79], the same 
address as the legitimate STA (blue). This creates problems for the monitoring system to 
separate unauthorized devices from authorized. The separation method should be based on 
authenticity verification in terms of a PKI implementation, as shown in figure 43. Based on 
the private-key signature verification the RADIUS server and the active response system 
coordinate which access point to reply. If the corporate access point (green) detects an 
unsigned authenticity request, it simply forwards this message to the RADIUS server which 
requests the fake AP (red) to associate with the potential intruder device.       
5.2.4 Location services and location capability 
Location services are important security features for high assurance WLAN’s. As described 
and mentioned in [81, 82, 83, 84], location services can be implemented using information 
aspects considering the basic 802.11 protocol, such as collecting received-signal-strength-
indication (RSSI) information and observing signal propagation delay [81, 83].  The RSSI 
field (1 byte) is defined by the 802.11 standard and consists of a numeric integer value with 
256 different signal levels, ranging from 0-255. The STA RSSI value varies according to the 
distance between the STA and AP and the noise level. By comparing RSSI values received by 
several passive devices it is possible to determine the distance and the location of 
corresponding STA’s. As mentioned in section 5.1.3, wireless location services and the ability 
to physically map devices, both legitimate and none-legitimate operating within the WLAN 
environment, are important security features. To do this the monitor system must include 
components which has location service functionality and is responsible for location control. 
The location server, which receives RF location data, is shown in figure 44. According to [81] 
location system which operates within a WLAN scenario must measure the signal strength 
and propagation delay from several sensor devices to parameterize a model of the WLAN 
environment. Active devices can be used to actively correspond, communicate and measure 
the round-trip latency [82], by exchanging messages. The location scenario is shown in figure 
44.          
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Figure 44: Location services 
As shown in figure 44, both passive sensor devices (yellow) and the active fake-AP device 
(red) are used to determine the exact intruder devices location. The passive sensors devices 
measures the received signal strength level based on RSSI information, while the fake-AP 
initiates contact with devices and transmits random bit-patterns to determined the packet-
transmission-time [83]. This measurement process is quit complex and as described in [83] 
the timing issue and device processing time makes it difficult to carry out accuracy. 
According to [84] calculations based on RSSI information field provides fairly accurate 
location assessment. An alternative solution is to implement location services by using global 
positioning systems (GPS) in order to localize wireless devices. As shown in figure 44 the 
location server must communicate and interconnect with the passive devices as well as the 
active devices. For additional security features the location server can be used to provide 
location based access control, as discussed in section 3.1.3. The RADIUS server can 
interconnect with the location server to provide WLAN location based access control [82]. 
This requires the location data to be implemented as part of the authentication requirement, 
and the LBAC protocol [82] describes how this could be accomplished.   
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5.2.5 Active responses 
Basically there are several ways to actively respond to attackers which infiltrate the wireless 
network. Typical active invasions, such as flooding and DOS attacks, can ruin wireless 
communication services completely. A certain way to protect the WLAN system from these 
threats is to let AP’s and STA’s automatically block the intruder based on the MAC address. 
On the other side, the MAC address is easy to spoof and attackers may change to a valid 
hardware address using eavesdropping and MAC-changing [79] tools. Alternatively the AP or 
STA being attacked could automatically disable the wireless connection to prevent the system 
from being compromised. On the other hand such response will automatically degrade the 
network performance which is probably the attacking objective in the first place. Other ways 
to defend the network is to perform counterattacks using the same weapons such as STA 
flooding or DOS attacks to turn down the attacking device. Alternatively, as explained in [75], 
the monitoring system could use the intruder profile to exploit weaknesses and to direct 
malformed frames at the attacker device to crash the attacking computer system. According to 
[75] this is not recommended as primary protection mechanism. A fourth way to handle active 
attacks is mechanisms to lure the attacker to associate with the “Fake AP honey pot” system 
as described in section 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. This will prevent the corporate WLAN network from 
being affected. The “Fake AP” honeypot system could alert administrator as well as worn the 
intruder, and use the monitor system to locate the device so that administrators can remove it 
physically. The active response system can potentially operate as followings: 
 
 
1. The passive monitor system observes the available channels, frames and the 
wireless traffic. If a threat is detected, the detection system will alarm the 
administrator system.   
2. If the “intruder”, as an unauthorized device (unsigned authenticity), experiments to 
associate with cooperate WLAN network, the corporate AP will block the intruder 
MAC address, and the wireless monitor system will automatically alert 
administrator and contact the active response system to transfer the “intruder” into 
the AP honeypot system. The AP honeypot system can warn the intruder and 
implore it to disconnect from the wireless network. 
3. If the “intruder” as an unauthorized device, performs flooding, DOS or other active 
attacks against the WLAN system, the monitor system should automatically 
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transfer the intruder to attack the “Fake AP” honeypot system. This will potentially 
prevent the cooperate network from being affected. The monitor system should 
locate the device from where it can be physically removed.   
4. If the intruder cannot be transferred to AP honeypot and continues to perform 
flooding or DOS attacks on a corporate WLAN AP, the monitor system may use 
its active devices (fake AP) to initiate counterattacks on the attacking device. The 
active response system will adjust the attack based on the intruder profile.    
5. The last way to defend the network is to disable the wireless connection to the AP 
or the STA being affected and alert administrator. Furthermore, use the monitor 
system to locate the device from where it can be physically removed. 
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5.3 A Monitor Defences System (MDS) 
As discussed above, a wireless monitor system made up with active response capabilities may 
increase security and in terms of protecting the wireless high assurance network. Still the 
system is complex and the idea must be composed and compiled for testing scenarios. In 
addition, as shown in the previous section, the MDS must interconnect with the corporate 
WLAN network to operate effectively and to be able to accurately separate legitimate and 
none-legitimate devices. Irrespective, a monitor defence system is a very good starting point 
for facing availability aspects concerning IEEE 802.11 environments. The monitor defence 
system architectural issues are shows in figure 45. The monitor system has been extended 
with active devices operating as “Fake AP’s” connected to a wireless honeypot solution. The 
active response system must interact with the RADIUS access control server to be able to 
automatically respond to devices which fail to authenticate. A location server has been 
inserted to provide location services. The location server receives location data from the 
passive devices as well as the active devices to determine legitimate and none-legitimate STA 
and AP positions.  
 
Figure 45: Monitor Defence System as a principal design  
The monitor defence system can be connected to a host based detection system and wired 
LAN based detection system. These systems are shown in figure 45 as potential expansion to 
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interconnect with the monitor core system. In addition, the Monitor Defence System must 
have a collaborative design, merging with the corporate WLAN solution. The monitor 
defence system interacting with the corporate WLAN network is shown in figure 46.   
 
Figure 46: A Monitor Defence System interconnecting with the corporate WLAN network 
 
5.4 Monitor systems used by attackers 
It is important to realize and confirm that wireless monitor systems can also be used by 
attackers to observe and obtain wireless network information. Achievable information aspects 
are identical to what traffic the wireless monitor sensor devices may capture. The advantage 
of a monitor defence system (MDF) is that interconnecting it with the corporate high 
assurance WLAN system, such as the RADIUS server, the location server and the corporate 
access points, adds benefits related verify information aspects connected to authenticity, 
confidentiality, integrity etc. An attacker monitor system (eavesdropper) does not know 
anything about keys or secrets and therefore lacks the ability to look into WLAN 
interoperability aspects. In addition if an attacker monitor system uses active devices, this will 
be quickly revealed by the monitor defence system. On the other side, attacker’s active 
devices can be used to probe types of response mechanisms which the monitor system has 
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implemented. For example the attacker can find out if the wireless network has a honeypot 
solution. But, by requesting services from the high assurance wireless network, attackers can 
not avoid being detected. Regardless, the monitor defence system has potential advantages 
beyond attackers which make it more difficult for attackers to infiltrate the high assurance 
network without being detected.     
5.5 Wireless monitor system conclusion 
We can conclude that monitoring systems based on wireless IEEE 802.11 sensors devices are 
fundamental and crucial tools to build secure wireless communication services. Wireless 
availability aspects demand the ability to control operations, supervise the wireless 
environment and protect wireless components.  A system that analyses the physical layer, the 
link-layer frames and also network layer packets has the ability to meet a wide range of 
threats concerning wireless LAN environments. The capability to handle intrusion and attacks 
depends on the ability to observer and detect abnormal behaviour and unwanted traffic. To 
respond the wireless threats, active components are required to correspond with potential 
intruders and to avoid prospective occurrence. Potential intruders and unauthorized devices 
which actively attempt to access the corporate WLAN can be automatically transferred to a 
honeypot AP system, which furthermore potentially could warn the intruder and prevent the 
devices from affecting the high assurance corporate WLAN. A wireless honeypot solution 
implemented for protection objectives in high assurance network, is preliminary theoretically 
approaches to how active response mechanisms could be implemented in a wireless context. 
Many challenges still remain according to interconnect and link up such solutions as a part of 
the corporate wireless network. It is way too early to recommend active protection 
mechanisms for implementation in high assurance wireless network, but the fundamental idea 
is promising and could potentially meet availability aspects and increase prevention for high 
assurance wireless networks. 
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6 WiFi security scenarios  
6.1 Case 1: Wireless links in public environments, using IEEE 
802.11 technology providing access to classified information 
networks.  
6.1.1 Problem description 
This first problem scenario is related to wireless IEEE 802.11 access points used as link-layer 
forwarders providing mobile radio access to communicate with a home environment. 
FLO/IKT offers wireless communication based on IEEE 802.11 technology in areas where 
mobile units drop in, for example military boats/ships ashore. Instead of using satellite 
communication services or cables, wireless networks can be used to provide flexible 
communication services using IEEE 802.11 technology. When a mobile unit comes within the 
range of a military WLAN transceiver, the mobile unit automatically interconnects with the 
wireless access point (AP), as shown in figure 47.   
     
Figure 47: Case 1 
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Security is ensured using an IPsec ESP solution to provide data confidentiality and integrity to 
the network layer (OSI-layer 3) and protect higher OSI-layers. The scenario considers a one-
to-one communication prospective. The problem with employing WLAN technology is 
security aspects concerning the wireless radio transmission availability and access control. 
Wireless access points (AP’s), which are physically secured and placed in public areas, are 
still available for anyone with equipment adapted for the IEEE 802.11 technology. To protect 
AP’s and the radio signal availability, mechanisms and security functionality must be 
implemented. Based on chapter 2, 3 4 and 5, this chapter will suggest ways to improve 
security related to the case 1 scenario, by proposing requirements and mechanisms to be 
implemented in order to ensure control access, supervise the environment and protect the 
wireless network.  
 
 
6.1.2 Threats  
Confidentiality and integrity are ensured using IPsec/ESP as an end-to-end IP security 
solution. Threats and vulnerabilities are concerned with access control and wireless 
availability aspects using the IEEE 802.11 technology. This scenario is shown in figure 48. 
The radio network requires OSI-layer 2 security and control mechanisms to secure to the 
wireless link between the access points (AP client and AP in route mode).  
 
Figure 48: Case 1 security aspects and threats concerning physical-layer and link-layer  
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6.1.3 Solution requirements  
Based on the discussion from chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5 the following requirements should be 
established to provide high assurance wireless interconnections:  
 
 Hardware security modules (HSM) 
 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and digital certificates  
 Centralized RADIUS server for access control and certificate verification 
 Three factor based authentication mechanisms (HSM, PKI-certificate, ID-password)  
 IEEE 802.1X mutual authentication using EAP-TLS 
 IEEE 802.11i RSN layer 2 confidentiality/integrity mechanisms, including AES-
CCMP and the 4-way handshake protocol 
 VPN architecture providing IPsec ESP connections for network layer (OSI-layer 3) 
security   
 Wireless monitor systems for supervision, detection and prevention 
 Wired based intrusion detection system (IDS)   
 Detection and respond policy enabled   
 
Security mechanisms used in high assurance wireless network should be based on 
requirements well founded in security methodology. Mechanisms and principles should be a 
composition of methods which in combination provides the ability to meet the threats and the 
surrounded vulnerabilities.  The access control solutions should be based on “something you 
know” and “something you have” at minimum, which signifies that the implementation 
should have a logical separated software/hardware security solution in combination with 
numbers of secrets. For example, a physical devices such as a hardware security module 
(HSM), makes it possible to add security features as a separated concept, flexible and 
independent from various types of wireless network components. A hardware security module 
(HSM) in combination with PKI digital certificates provides a flexible and strong basis for 
authentication and validation. Implementing a centralized RADIUS server solution in 
combination with EAP-TLS, access control prospectives should be well assured and well 
protected. Due to wireless availability aspects, it is recommended to use AES-CCMP (OSI 
layer 2 encryption) to protect network layer (layer 3) information. A wireless monitor system 
is required to supervise and control the wireless environment.  The monitor system can be 
used to detect security breaches and threats, and report the security condition. Based on this a 
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respond policy should be established to protect the network if a threat or an attack is detected. 
A wired intrusion detection system is capable to analyze data which the wireless monitor 
system can not validate. The overall architecture is shown in the next section.           
6.1.4 Architectural discussion 
The security architecture is based on using a public key infrastructure to implement high 
assurance access control, adapted with Robust Security Network configuration (RSN) based 
on IEEE 802.11i and IEEE 802.11X principals. To separate security, a Hardware Security 
Module (HSM) has been integrated to handle security processing, key handling and storage. 
The architectural scenario is shown in figure 49.  
 
Figure 49: A PKI based HMS architecture using IEEE 802.1X and IEEE 802.11i 
As discussed in chapter 3, implementing PKI with 802.1X leads to that EAP-TLS is the best 
choice as a well adapted protocol for PKI services, and well supported for handling secure 
transmission of authentication credentials and key establishment data. The HSM device with a 
valid PKI certificate, plus a user identification password is required to authenticate with 
RADIUS server and to establish a wireless connection. This signifies that three-factor based 
authentication is recommended for accessing the wireless network. Since the number of 
wireless links towards the route-mode access-point is considered to be few, a centralized 
RADIUS server solution would be a flexible and scalable solution, but as discussed in chapter 
3 and 4, the AP should be able to verify signed EAPOL request, to effectively refuse clients 
which do not have a valid PKI certificate. Private keys can be used to sign layer two messages 
to ensure authenticity. For example unauthenticated association requests could be effectively 
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refused by the access points. As shown in figure 50, this requires that both access points and 
the RADIUS server possess PKI certificates. This will prevent unauthorized device from 
experimenting with the RADIUS server and thereby decrease the flow of unauthorized 
RADIUS authentication messages on the LAN side. Due to eavesdropping and passive 
monitoring, layer 2 encryption using AES-CCMP limits the availability and protects network 
layer information aspects. To transmit data between the access point and the home 
environment, VPN IPsec tunnels are used to protect the communication. The scenario is 
shown in figure 50.    
 
Figure 50: Best practice security architecture 
 
IPsec tunnels are used to protect authentication and key distribution traffic transmitted 
between the HSM and the RADIUS server on the wired network. The same security solution 
is used to transmit monitor data between the wireless sensor and the monitor core system. The 
monitor system is responsible for AP perimeter control which involves supervising the 
wireless channels surrounded with the corporate access point (AP). A response policy should 
be established if threats or intrusions are detected. A typical policy can be to terminate the 
wireless AP connection and use satellite transmission if severe event or attacks threatening the 
wireless network. An alternative solution is to implement an active response system and 
honeypot network as discussed in chapter 5, but such solution will increase the overall 
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complexity considerably. Because the AP operates in public environments, the monitor 
system will become an essential tool for wireless prevention. In addition a wired LAN sensor 
IDS system should be implemented to analyse plaint text data and to handle frames which the 
monitor system can not validate. A shown in figure 50 the IDS systems must be implemented 
at the mobile unit and within the home environment.      
 
Advantages: 
 
 Strong security requirements enabled 
 Hardware security module provides an external security element which result in high 
flexibility and AP independency 
 Dual encryption (VPN Psec/ESP and CCMP)  
 Scalability due to a centralized PKI deployment for secure authentication and key 
establishment 
 PKI can be used to sign frames floating between STA and AP, which would increases 
security when it comes to message authenticity, secure access control and prevent 
particular DOS and flooding attacks. 
 A monitor systems could be used to control and supervise access point availability by 
scanning Wi-Fi channels and report this information to a detection server   
 
Potential improvements and disadvantages: 
 
 Data throughput and performance 
 High complexity 
 Wireless monitor core system interaction must be closer evolved 
 HSM support in AP’s 
 Authenticity to management frames and control frames (802.11w) 
 Using PKI to sign OSI-layer 2 messages requires solution development  
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6.2 Case 2: Establishing wireless environments based on IEEE 
802.11 technology providing accesses to classified information 
networks. 
6.2.1 Problem description 
This problem scenario is related to establishing deployable military wireless environments 
based on IEEE 802.11 networks, providing access to classified information systems. The 
wireless operation concept is considered as a one-to-many relation. The scenario differs from 
the previous case because confidentiality, authenticity and integrity must be added on to the 
wireless clients. Each STA device that operates within the wireless network must be 
authorized to be able to establish connection with the AP. The case concept requires access 
control, confidentiality, authenticity and integrity mechanisms as well as availability 
protection. In this section design issues and requirements related to architectural security 
solutions will be presented. The architecture is based on discussions and conclusions from 
chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5, and the thesis proposes a basis fundament for implementing high 
assurance WLAN networks. Figure 51 shows WLAN prospectives related to the case two 
scenario.       
 
Figure 51: Case 2 
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6.2.2 Threats 
Case two threat aspects are concerning access control, confidentiality and availability, which 
means that approved security functionality must be added to the wireless clients (STA’s). 
Threats are surrounded with the 802.11 protocol establishing secure connections to a 
distribution system with access to classified information. The scenario is shown in figure 52. 
 
 
Figure 52: Threats concerning high assurance WLAN environments to access classified DS 
6.2.3 Solutions requirements 
Based on the discussion from chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5 the following requirements should be 
established to provide high assurance wireless interconnections: 
 
 Hardware security module (HSM) 
 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and digital certificates   
 RADIUS server for access control 
 Three-factor based authentication mechanisms (HSM, PKI-certificate, id-password)  
 IEEE 802.1X mutual authentication using EAP TLS 
 IEEE 802.11i RSN layer 2 confidentiality/integrity mechanisms, including AES-
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CCMP and the 4-way handshake protocol 
 VPN architecture providing IPsec ESP end-to-end connections for network layer 
(OSI-layer 3) security 
 Location system for access control, wireless mapping and location overview  
 Monitor sensor system for perimeter control and supervision 
 Wired LAN based intrusion detection system (IDS) 
 Protection and wireless honeypot system for automatic responses and prevention. 
 Detection and respond policy enabled.   
6.2.4 Architectural discussion 
The security architecture showed in figure 53 describes the authentication process from AP 
discovery to an AES-CCMP encrypted link (OSI-layer-2) is up and running. The architecture 
consists of digital certificates (PKI) implemented into STA’s, Access Points (AP’s) and the 
RADIUS server, whereas IEEE 802.1X combined with mutual EAP-TLS mechanisms is used 
to establish secure and encrypted wireless link-layer (OSI-layer-2) connections. The frame 
work is basically similar to the access control approach discuss end described from chapter 3 
and 4.   
 
Figure 53: IEEE 802.1X EAP/TLS combined with PKI certificates 
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Since the architecture implements PKI, private keys can be use sign messages. Ideally, every 
frame transported between the STA and AP should include signatures to ensure authenticity, 
but that would potentially degrade network performance. As long as the AES-CCMP 
encrypted link is up and running, authenticity to data frames are ensured by the IEEE 802.11i 
settlement. To improve authenticity, the thesis suggests adding signatures to the first two EAP 
messages shown in figure 53; EAPOL-start and EAP-ID request. This can be done by using 
implemented PKI features to sign these messages using the private key. Such solution will 
efficiently prevent STA’s from connecting a rogue access point as well as the corporate AP to 
block falsified STA certificates. Additionally, this will prevent the AP from EAPOL flooding 
attacks, and it makes it possible for the AP to automatically block STA’s which do not have a 
valid signature. As shown in figure 53 this requires the AP to known the public keys. Another 
problem issue is management frames and control frames which is not covered by the RSN 
802.11i settlement. It is not necessary to encrypt these frames but it is important for the AP 
and STA can verify the transmitter.  One approach is to use PKI features to add authenticity to 
management frames and control frames. This would potentially prevent flooding and DOS 
attacks against management and control frames, but it would probably slow down network 
performance. Such a scenario must be tested and confirmed for it can be recommended. As 
discussed in chapter 5, the monitor defence system can monitor EAPOL messages and 
interconnect with RADIUS server in order determined if a device should connect to the 
wireless honeypot network or to the corporate wireless network. Such solution requires the 
monitor system to know the public keys. Figure 54 shows a recommended wireless IEEE 
802.11 architecture, which enables and implements OSI-layer 2 access control, location 
control, wireless detection, and protection functionality. As discussed in chapter 5, the 
solution is based on implementing a wireless monitor defence system (MDS) which consists 
of passive and active sensor devices. As concluded in chapter 5 the monitor defence system is 
only a theoretically approach, and a market research study is required to find status on 
available monitor defence systems capabilities.   
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Figure 54: Wireless IEEE 802.11 environment with a monitor defence architecture 
Case two considers the number of wireless links towards the access-point to be many, which 
means that the wireless core system, compared to case one, has been extended as shown in 
figure 54. A passive wireless monitor system is still represented, but in addition, an active 
response system and a honeypot solution have been added. As discussed in chapter 5, an 
active response system is required to automatically respond to threats. The location server is 
recommended to be used for access control and for the monitor system to locate devices. This 
will make it possible to control the wireless access range. The passive devices and the monitor 
system task accomplish parameter control and wireless network supervision. In addition the 
monitor core system uses the active response devices to protect and prevent the wireless 
environment from threats, as described in section 5.2. 
 
To establish a secure wireless interconnection with the controlled area, link-layer security can 
not provide end-to-end security. VPN technology in terms of a VPN concentrator (gateway) 
can be sued to establish secure network layer (OSI-layer-3) connection from STA’s and in to 
the controlled network area. This scenario is shown in figure 55.  
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Figure 55: Network layer security with VPN concentrator placed within the mobile environment 
The network layer, as described in section 2.6 provides the ability to secure data transmission 
transparently, and ensure security for end-to-end prospectives and requirements. The solution 
in figure 55 is based on IPsec ESP tunnels directed from the STA and in to the mobile 
environment controlled area. A secondary IPSec ESP solution must be established to transmit 
data from the mobile environment to the home environment distribution system. It is 
important to confirm that network-layer security such as VPN IPSec technology only provides 
extended security features to data being transmitted between the STA and the distribution 
system (DS). VPN IPsec is transparent to wireless network security technology and does not 
increase wireless security aspects.   
 
One alternative solution to figure 55, is to let the STA establish an IPsec ESP connection 
directly from the client (STA) to the home network controlled area (distribution system). This 
scenario is shown in figure 56.     
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Figure 56: Network layer and end-to-end security between STA and home environment VPN concentrator 
As shown in figure 56, IPSec ESP security is tunneled from the STA and let the STA 
establish secure network layer connection from its device into the home environment VPN 
gateway (VPN concentrator). This solution represents high level of transparency as well as a 
high level of security.  The problem is that the mobile environment system does not have the 
possibility to examine and verify data before it is transmitted to the home network area. 
Basically this signifies that the wired sensor IDS system, shown in figure 54, must be 
implemented at the home environment.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Agder University College Faculty of Engineering and Science 
  120 
Advantages: 
 Strong security requirements enabled 
 Hardware security module provides an external security element which result in high 
flexibility and STA/AP independency 
 Dual encryption (VPN IPsec/ESP and CCMP)  
 PKI and digital certificates for secure access control including authentication and key 
establishment. 
 PKI can be used to sign frames transmitted between STA and AP, which would 
increases security related to authenticity and message origin (transmitter verification) 
 PKI signature could prevent several threats related to DOS, flooding attacks and 
particular rogue access points 
 A wireless monitor system which implements passive devices is used to control and 
supervise availability by scanning Wi-Fi channels and report channel data to a 
intrusion detection system 
 Location services which makes it possible to physically map and position wireless 
devices within the wireless network area 
 Location based access control would prevent devices to operate to far away from the 
corporate wireless network area.  
 Wirelesses monitor system which implements active devices to protect the wireless 
network environment.  
 Monitor defence system which inserts protection functionality by implementing a 
wireless honeypot network to trap attackers.  
 VPN IPsec technology to provide end-to-end security control   
 
Potential improvements:  
 STA firewalls and IDS systems have not been discussed in this thesis but is an 
important part of STA security aspects, especially for protection of higher OSI-model 
layers.  
 AP and STA configuration aspects have not been discussed widely but referred to the 
thesis appendix, some important wireless configuration utilities are considered.  
 Combining IPSec ESP and AES-CCMP will potentially degrade network performance 
and data throughput. The scenario should be tested and verified as composite solution.  
 The IEEE 802.11w standard introduces improved security aspects related to safeguard 
management and control frames. An approved version of 802.11w is extended to be 
announced in 2008. The thesis appendix introduced the 802.11w security 
improvements. 
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 Access control and availability aspects  
This thesis has discussed access control and availability aspects concerning wireless 
technology based on the IEEE 802.11 protocol. Based on this, the thesis has presented and 
proposed important requirements and claims which compose architectural ways to achieve 
high-end security in wireless networks. By employing principles based on Robust Security 
Network (RSN) using IEEE 802.1X for access control and IEEE 802.11i for confidentiality, 
integrity and authenticity, wireless communication aspects are fairly secured. Due to the lack 
of authenticity, especially for handling management frames and EAP start messages, wireless 
networks are still vulnerable to various attacks. To meet such vulnerabilities, authenticity 
should be implemented into every frame transmitted between the wireless station (STA) and 
the access point (AP). Implementing WLAN solution based on public key infrastructures 
(PKI) would straighten these problems because PKI features can be used to sign link-layer 
messages and verify transmitters (message origin).  
7.1.1 Access control requirements  
The thesis has focused on important access control requirements which a high assurance 
wireless network should be founded on. The most important issue is connected to 
implementing a hardware security module (HSM) combined with digital PKI certificates to 
provide three-factor authentication. Access control is ensured using IEEE 802.1X with EAP-
TLS and IEEE 802.11i to provide robust security networks associations (RSNA’s) including 
mutual authentications, key establishment through the 4-way handshake procedure and 
establishment of an AES-CCMP link-layer encrypted data-channel providing confidentiality, 
integrity and authenticity.    
 
7.1.2 Network layer advantages and requirements 
Network layer security introduces additional security features in terms of end-to-end security 
control in wireless networks. The thesis recommends VPN and IPSec ESP tunnelling 
techniques to be used to securely transmit data between wireless end-devices and the 
controlled area.  
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7.1.3 Control, detection and protection requirements 
In chapter 5 the thesis has introduced wireless monitor systems which are responsible for 
perimeter control and capable to detect abnormalities and handle threats from intruder devices 
in order to protect and supervise the wireless network environment. A monitor defence system 
(MDS) introduces complex architectures and subsequent high costs, but may potentially 
control availability and overcome a wide range of threats concerning IEEE 802.11 networks. 
An optimized monitor defence system must interconnect with the corporate AP network to be 
able to verify security conditions and effectively detect security breaches. The monitor system 
introduces passive and active devices to be able protect the wireless network. The passive 
devices act as sensors to monitor wireless channels and frames, whereas the active devices 
introduce decoys to lure potential attackers by implementing wireless honeypot networks. In 
addition wireless location control has been recommended as important security features to 
map and position wireless devices. The wireless monitor defence system is only a 
theoretically approach on how to insert security mechanisms for active protection 
functionality and requires further investment in terms of prototyping and development for 
testing scenarios. Passive and active monitoring systems may also be used by attackers 
(eavesdroppers) to obtain wireless network information. Attackers and intruders can use 
passive monitor systems to obtain physical-layer and link-layer header information aspects. 
Passive monitoring is difficult to handle and requires the wireless high assurance system to 
trust implemented confidentiality mechanisms. By implementing a monitor defence system, 
the corporate high assurance WLAN environment implements facilities to detect active 
devices within the wireless network area, and thereby the ability to control the wireless 
network environment.  
7.1.4 Security scenarios requirements 
Based on a study focussing on access control and availability aspects, the thesis has discussed 
and recommended security architectures for two WLAN problem scenarios. The proposed 
solution includes several important security features which a high assurance wireless network 
should be founded on. It can be concluded that security mechanisms must be implemented 
through adjustments of the two available security protocols IEEE 802.1X and IEEE 802.11i, 
in combination with wireless monitor systems adding control, detection and protection 
facilities. As described and shown in chapter 6, security mechanisms implemented for high 
assurance wireless networks signifies heavy implementations, high complexity and 
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subsequent high costs.  Further investment and research would potentially develop more 
integrated high assurance functionality to simplify circumstances and the environmental 
complexity. 
7.2 Further work 
This thesis work has been based on descriptive and explanatory research and is founded on a 
theoretically approach to an implementation of a high assurance wireless solution focusing on 
access control and availability aspects. Work still remains, and the following is recommended 
for further studies:   
 
 CCMP combined with IPsec – compatibility and efficiency 
 WLAN security performance and scalability aspects 
 Market research for monitor systems and implementation capabilities 
 RSN high assurance WLAN prototype system built as a laboratory environment 
 Implementation of STA firewalls and intrusion detection system (IDS) 
 Appropriate HSM solution for high assurance WLAN environments 
 Implementation issues considering WLAN honeypot’s and fake access points. 
 Communication and cooperation aspects considering interconnected high assurance 
WLAN networks and wireless defence systems 
 Wireless defence system prototyping 
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9 Appendix 
 
9.1 WPA 2.0 
The WPA 2.0 standard was released in September 2004, and introduces the complete ratified 
version of the IEEE 802.11i standard. According to [9], products that holds a WPA 2.0 
certification compiles with the IEEE 802.11 standard as amended by IEEE 802.11i which 
means that such products can be recommended for use in Robust Security Networks (RSN). 
WPA 2.0 enterprise certified and FIPS validated products builds on a quality assurance 
related to high assurance wireless communication services. The WAP 2.0 certification 
validates interoperability with selected EAP methods, and is approved according to 
compatibility with operational requirements. The problem with WPA 2.0 is that there 
currently exist no WPA 2.0 certified products providing AS functionality [9].  This means that 
implementing RADIUS (AAA) servers may cause interoperability problems with WPA 2.0 
certified products. This signifies that commercial WPA 2.0 products used to provide RSN 
solutions must be tested and closely evaluated before implementation. 
9.2 WLAN security configuration aspects 
In this section we will identify some important security aspects and configuration utilities 
which should be considered in order to implement wireless solutions for high assurance 
networks.   
9.2.1 Configuration security aspects  
In this section I will shortly discuss some vulnerabilities and security aspects following the 
aim for a best practice security configuration. 
 
 SSID broadcasting and configuration 
The Service Set Identifier (SSID) is the name that identifies and distinguishes different 
WLAN’s. The SSID must be changed from the default value to an appropriate name. Because 
this name identifies the WLAN, it should be hard to guess for outsiders and must not provide 
any information about the organization. SSID cloaking techniques, as described and 
recommended in [69], proposes to hide the SSID information by replacing a null value in to 
the SSID field in broadcast and probe request messages, as well disabling AP’s SSID 
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broadcasting. The intention is to reduce availability and to make it difficult to discover the 
wireless network. Thus, cloak-configuration can be vulnerable to attacks using attack tools 
such as KARMA [70] which identifies probe request messages in order to set up rogue access 
points. As described in [71], KARMA can detect a disclosed SSID from a STA probe request 
to impersonate the AP and to fool the STA to connect to a none-legitimate rogue access point. 
We can conclude that hiding the SSID in an 802.11 network is extremely difficult, but by 
making complicated SSID names, changing them at regular intervals, and turning off SSID 
broadcast will prevent the wireless network from easy discovery.           
 
 WLAN firewalls, personal firewalls and anti-virus software for all STA’s  
A firewall solution can be used to enforce a certain security policy by creating rules and allow 
authorized protocols and services to traverse. Such a solution can be used protect the interface 
between the WLAN and the distribution system, as well as between AP and STA’s. Firewalls 
and antivirus software must be required for all STA’s, and a firewall solution can be locally 
adapted to enforce strong security requirements. According to [9], a STA-firewall solution 
can prevent direct attacks on STA’s before the 4 way-handshake has successfully completed.      
 
 WLAN and secure system management 
IEEE 802.11i does not specify any requirements according to safeguard management system 
and administration of wireless networks. Based on this and because of wireless availability 
aspects, high assurance WLAN system should deactivate the possibility to manage the WLAN 
system over the wireless interface. A physical connection adapted with a suitable security 
protocol (SNMPv3, SSL/TLS, SSH or IPSec) can be used for administrative purposes. To 
extend management security, as described in [9], a dedicated Virtual LAN (VLAN) channel 
can be established to segregate management traffic. This will prevent none-administrators 
from accessing management resources.    
      
9.3 IEEE 802.11w, work in progress  
According to [77] management frames are not authenticated. This is very vulnerable because 
attacker can use such use such frames to perform DOS attacks. The 802.11w standard aims to 
provide management frame protection (MFP) by appending authenticity to each management 
frame sent between STA and AP. The authenticity is implemented using a signed AES 
HMAC code (AES hash messages authentication code (HMAC)). As a result the AP will not 
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accept management’s frame which do not have a valid authentication code, and thereby 
potentially block flooding and DOS attacks.  The IEEE 802.11 standard is expected to be 
announced in 2008.  
 
 
